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THE TREATMENT OF EQUIPMENT LEASES AS




Like any other form of installment credit or loan transaction pro-
viding for the debtor's acquiring possession of goods, an equipment
lease enables the lessee to obtain the use of goods without providing
the full capital. Similar to a conditional sale or chattel mortgage, the
equipment lease also enables the financer to protect his investment by
retaining tide to the leased goods. However, the reasons for the in-
creased popularity of leasing are not merely credit and security, since
these benefits have been readily available in conditional sale and chattel
mortgage transactions. Leases are used to achieve other functional and
legal purposes. Yet, the Uniform Commercial Code classifies some
types of leases in the same category as conditional sales and chattel
mortgages, namely as security agreements.
In this article, the purpose and function of the equipment lease will
be analyzed to determine whether, under the Uniform Commercial
Code, such leases require treatment different from other security agree-
ments. The present definition of security interest in section 1-201 (37)
of the Code will be examined, with particular attention given to leases
in order to determine the extent to which this definition is consistent
with the basic objectives of Article 9. Reference will be made to the
tests applied by the courts in interpreting and applying this definition,
and an attempt will be made to answer the following questions:
(a) Is it feasible to distinguish between a lease intended as a security
device and a "true" lease not so intended?
(b) If the distinction is feasable, what test or tests are most appropriate
to give effect to the policy underlying Article 9?
'BA., University of Sydney, 1959; LL.B., University of Sydney, 1962; LL.M.,
Harvard University, 1964. Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Sydney. The author
wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Professor 0. Whitfield Broome of
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(c) What policy reasons would favor a blanket rule requiring the
filing of a financing statement in respect of all leases involving a
stipulated minimum term and rental in order to preserve the lessor's
interest against lien creditors of, or purchasers from, the lessee?
(d) Should these policy reasons prevail?
REASONS FOR LEASING
A number of diverse factors may influence parties to choose the
lease form. These factors do not remain constant or of equal import-
ance, but vary according to the needs of the parties and changes in
different areas of the law, Sometimes a lease transaction structured to
take advantage of one factor will automatically preclude the achievement
of an alternative advantage. It may be argued that a review of the
economic and legal reasons for the increased incidence of leasing are
irrelevant to the status of a lease for purposes of Article 9, However,
it is submitted that any thorough inquiry cannot ignore these reasons,
since the definition of a security interest under the Code hinges upon
the intention of the parties to the lease agreement.'
Leasing of equipment is not a new device. It has been used at least
since the opening of the railroads in the second half of the nineteenth
century, in a form which came to be known generally as the "Phila-
delphia-Plan" equipment trust.2 Since World War II, leasing has re-
ceived a substantial stimulus from the general movement toward a credit
economy and the business community's acceptance of debt financing.
However, even these two occurrences do not fully explain the increas-
ing popularity of leasing relative to other forms of credit financing.
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(37) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
2. See generally FREEMAN, EQUIPMENT TRUSTS (1949); Rawle, Car Trust Securities,
8 A.B.A. REP. 277 (1885).
3. In 1955, it was estimated that 10 percent of all equipment then being manufactured
would be leased. Griesinger, Pros and Cons of Leasing Equipment, 33 HAiv. Bus. REv.
75 (1955).
It has been estimated that gross rentals under equipment leases quadrupled to $400
million in the decade 1950-1960. Adkins and Bardos, The Leasing Transaction, 1962
U. ILL. L.F. 16.
In 1959, Charles W. Steadman stated: "[Tihis leasing activity is confined almost
entirely to the United States. It is a peculiarly American answer to the problem of the
lack of adequate capital resources . . . 2" Mr. Steadman attributed this peculiarity to
"rising costs and the inadequate depreciation policies of the federal government's tax
program." Steadman, Chattel Leasing-A Vehicle for Capital Expansion, 14 Bus. LAW-
YER 523 (1959). Since 1959, the trend has crossed the Atlantic to Great Britain and the
Pacific to Australia. See Truswell, Equipment Leasing: A New Financial Technique,
108 SoL. J. 867 (1964). Available statistics for financing by Australian finance com-
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Until 1954, taxation was one dominant reason for leasing. Other recur-
rent reasons were the real and supposed advantages obtained from the
omission of leased assets from the lessee's balance sheet. Each of these
reasons is now of diminished importance.
In the following discussion, the term true lease is used to refer to
leases not intended as security and which therefore properly fall out-
side the scope of Article 9. Although the distinction is close to that
drawn by the financial analyst between an operating lease and a finan-
cial lease, it is the Article 9 test which is important for present purposes.
Income Tax Reasons
The income tax advantages of a sale and lease-back of real estate
are well known and documented. 4 Tax reasons predominate in the real
estate situation because land itself cannot be depreciated for tax pur-
poses,5 although rental paid to a third party for the use of land is fully
deductible.' On the other hand, the total capital cost of equipment can
be deducted as depreciation. From a taxation viewpoint the choice
between leasing and purchasing will depend, for the most part, upon
a comparison of the rate of depredation allowed with the rental cost.
Where the minimum depreciation period is longer than the normal
rental term, leasing will afford a means of obtaining greater tax deduc-
tions in early years. Of course, the tax advantages eventually expire,
panies show that the initial capital cost of equipment and plant financed by true lease
during the financial year 1968-69 was double the amount for 1966-67. In the fastest
developing state of Western Australia, the 1968-69 figures were three times those for
1966-67. By way of comparison, wholesale hire-purchase of inventory by the same
companies rose by only 30 percent for the nation and 32.7 percent for Western Aus-
tralia during the same period and other commercial loans by 57 percent and 84 percent
respectively. COMMONWEALTH BUREAU OF CENSUS AND STATISTICS, FINANCE COMPANIES
1968-69.
4. Cary, Corporate Financing through Sale and Lease-Back of Property: Business,
Tax and Policy Considerations, 62 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1948); Cary, Current Tax Problems
in Sale, or Gift, and Lease-Back Transactions, in N.Y.U. 9TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 959
(1951). But see Lassers, Does a Lease-Back Save You Money?, 32 TAXES 279 (1954).
5. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 167 and Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (1956). The advantages
under the Australian Income Tax Law are even more marked, since depreciation is
confined to plant and articles used or installed ready for use for the purpose of pro-
ducing assessable income. The only exceptions are fences, dams, and other structural
improvements on agricultural or pastoral land or for pearling operations, plumbing
fixtures and fittings on business premises for the use of employees, and building struc-
tures to the extent to which they are essential to the support of working plant. Income
Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act, § 54, 1936 as amended (Austl.).
6. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 162(a) (3). The benefit of this tax deduction must be
balanced against the fact that the lessee gains no capital appreciation of an owned asset
as a hedge against inflation and is left with no asset at the expiration of the lease.
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but in the meantime the lessee has had the opportunity to arrange his
higher rentals to correspond with high income years and to defer pay-
ment of tax.
Where the higher rentals in earlier years exceed the interest cost of
borrowing the capital to purchase the equipment (and this higher cost
would not be fully recouped by tax savings), the lease method will tend
to reduce rather than increase available working capital. This is one
illustration of the point already mentioned that certain advantages of
leasing are self-cancelling and only available in the alternative.
The tax advantage of leasing resulting from the slow depreciation
methods permissible was largely removed by the 1954 amendments to
the Internal Revenue Code, which permitted methods of accelerated
depreciation.7 While some tax situations may still tip the scale in favor
of leasing, most commentators agree that the previous marked advan-
tage no longer exists. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that in
certain situations depreciation may offer positive tax advantages when
compared to rental payments." Other less important tax advantages may
still be available, such as arranging for rentals to be tied to the same
variables as profits (for example, the number of units produced by the
leased equipment), thus performing the economic function of equity
financing and resulting in a tax deduction at the same time.9
From the lessor's viewpoint, the 1954 amendments enhanced the
advantages of leasing, since available depreciation deductions in the
early years of the equipment's useful life were accelerated. However,
the following practices used by lessors to increase their tax savings have
now been rejected by the courts.
(a) A lessor intending to hold assets for only a part of their useful
7. Id. § 167(b). This section substituted for the previous straight-line method a
choice available to the taxpayer of: (1) the straight-line method; (2) the declining
balance method at a rate not exceeding twice the rate under (1); (3) the sum of the
years digits method; and (4) any other consistent method productive of an annual
allowance which, when added to all allowances for the period commencing with the
taxpayer's use of the property and including the taxable year, does not, during the first
two-thirds of the useful life of the property, exceed the total of such allowances which
would have been used had such allowances been computed under method (2). Under
method (2), two-thirds of the capital cost may be written off during the first half
of the useful life of the equipment; and under method (3) approximately 70 percent
may be depreciated during that period.
8. Gant, Illusion in Lease Financing, 37 HARV. Bus. REv. 121, 126, exh. II (1959).
9. Dean, The Economics of Equipment Leasing, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 33, 39. However,
field surveys indicate that this type of arrangement is generally confined to true use
leases, for example, of highway construction equipment or photocopying machines for
relatively short initial periods.
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life would use accelerated depreciation methods based upon cost less a
low salvage value, which itself was based upon the assumption that the
assets would be held for their entire useful life. The court substituted
for salvage value the estimated value upon contemplated resale by the
lessor.' 0
(b) Similarly, where the taxpayer used the declining balance method,
which ignores salvage value, the court prohibited depreciation to a
lower level than the estimated resale value.
11
(c) Where the lessor holds assets for less than three years, the
accelerated methods of depreciation introduced in 1954 are not avail-
able. These methods are limited to property with a useful life of three
years or more, and in this context useful life means useful life in the
business of the lessor.' 2
Another advantage previously available to lessors has been removed
by the depreciation recapture provisions introduced in 1962. Prior to
that date, where a lessee was not offered or did not exercise an option
to purchase the equipment, a resale by the lessor afforded an opportunity
for the additional profit to be taxed at capital-gains rate.'3 Since 1962,
under section 1245 of the Internal Revenue Code, any gain on the
disposition of such property attributable to depreciation must be re-
captured and treated as ordinary income of the lessor.
The theoretical possibility remains of the lessor reselling, for less
than the adjusted basis, equipment upon which the lessor has already
fully recouped from rentals its capital costs plus interest. If both lessor
and lessee had the benefit of hindsight, this additional profit would not
have been available to the lessor, since in theory it represents the higher
price which the lessee must pay for the lessor's assuming the risk of
obsolescence. In effect, the lessee has insured a possible loss which did
not materialize; the lessee has paid in rentals the full market price for
the use of equipment during a period of time which turned out to be
substantially less than the economic life of the equipment. The lessor has
gambled on a longer useful life, and won.
One definite tax advantage does remain for the lessor of equipment, in
that it may be able to depreciate the equipment over a shorter period
than an owner-user who must use the economic or useful life span.
In contrast, the lessor will normally be able to treat the initial term of
10. Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92 (1960) (decided under the
1939 Code).
11. Hertz Corp. v. United States, 364 U.S. 122 (1960) (decided under the 1954 Code).
12. Id.
13. Steadman, supra note 3, at 539.
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the lease as its economic life. However, the lessor's advantage will be
confined to deferral, rather than reduction, of tax liability because of
the recapture provisions.
In the special situation of equipment leases between associated tax-
payers, total income tax liability may be reduced by splitting income.
However, because of high corporate tax rates and the need to set
rentals in line with current market prices and justify the leasing trans-
action as serving a legitimate business purpose, this possibility is likely
to operate as a rather limited incentive."4
Thus, as recently as 1962, the president of a substantial leasing cor-
poration readily admitted: "The illusion of massive tax advantages has
died slowly but today few responsible lessors are basing their sales
appeal for lease contracts on tax advantages." 35
Financing and Accounting Reasons
Proponents of leasing allege that leasing makes possible a greater
aggregate volume of financing.
This question of whether lease financing can in fact make it pos-
sible to have the cake and eat it too is perhaps the most signifi-
cant, and certainly the most disturbing, issue raised by the grow-
ing trend toward leasing.1'
Viewed objectively, the adoption of leasing as a substitute for debt
financing should not enable a corporation to borrow more. Most indus-
trial debt financing is unsecured, reliance being placed primarily upon
the general credit of the borrower.
And since a lease is also a form of general credit obligation, a
company should be able to obtain at least as much financing
through a direct loan as it can through a lease commitment.'7
(Emphasis supplied).
14. Comment, Acquisition of Industrial and Conmzercial Equipment through Leasing
Arrangements, 66 YALE L.J. 751, 758-59 (1957).
15. Boothe, The Practical Pros and Cons of Leasing, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 3.
16. Gant, supra note 8, at 130.
17. Id. Emphasis has been added to the words "at lease' since the evidence indicates
that, depending upon the source of debt financing available to the borrower, the total
cost of leasing normally runs up to one percent higher than ordinary debt financing,
thereby weakening slightly the profitability and cash flow position of the borrower.
Witherby, Personal Property Lease Financing-The Lender's Point of View, 1963
DuE LJ. 98, 101. Cf. Boothe, supra note 15, at 10; Dean, supra note 9, at 40-42; Gant,
supra note 8, at 126.
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Despite these objective facts, corporate borrowers have been able
in the past to obtain more credit by using a combination of leasing
and debt financing.18 Traditional debt obligations undertaken subse-
quent to leasing may also be marketed at lower interest rates than would
otherwise have applied. The availability of larger borrowings at lower
rates has often more than compensated for the higher cost of leasing.
These anomalies were made possible by prevailing conventions in the
presentation of the balance sheet of corporate lessees.
Accounting theory today generally provides that installment obliga-
tions for equipment purchased under conditional sale agreements must
be capitalized and disclosed as a liability in the buyer's balance sheet,
and that the equipment must correspondingly be recorded as an asset.
In the case of equipment held under a long-term lease, however, many
companies continue to omit the liability and the asset from their bal-
ance sheet and merely record rentals as recurrent expenses in the
period in which they are paid. This practice has several advantages
for the lessee: it enhances the ratios of its assets to debt, net worth to
debt, and earnings to debt. Thus, the practice represents an inflated
appearance of creditworthiness and profitability. While it appears that
institutional investors,:9 the Securities and Exchange Commission, 0
and professional accountants are aware of this situation, smaller lenders
and shareholders are less likely to take into account the possibility that
a company's balance sheet may not record the true picture.
More recently, action has been taken by the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants to rectify this situation. In 1949, the In-
stitute recommended that:
18. MYERS, REPORTING oF LEASES IN FINANCING STATEMENTS 13 (AICPA Accounting
Research Study No. 4, 1962).
19. Cohen, The Future of Lease Financing Under New Depreciation Rules, 98 J.
ACCOUNTANCY 189, 192 (1954).
20. SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-18 (1971) states:
(a) If material in amount the pertinent facts relative to firm commit-
ments for the acquisition of permanent investments and fixed assets and for
the purchase, repurchase, construction, or rental of assets under long-term
leases shall be stated briefly in the balance sheet or in footnotes referred to
therein.
(b) Where the rentals or obligations under long-term leases are material
there shall be shown the amounts of annual rentals under such leases with
some indication of the periods for which they are payable, together with
any important obligation assumed or guarantee made in connection there-
with. If the rentals are conditional, state the minimum annual amounts.
The SEC also requires the inclusion of a portion of all rentals, if material, as "fixed
charges" in registration statements filed on Form S-9 where the ratio of earnings to
fixed charges is shown in a summary of earnings.
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where the rentals or other obligations under long-term leases are
material in the circumstances, . . . disclosure should be made in
financial statements or in notes thereto.21
The test adopted was whether "the transaction involved is in substance
a purchase." A later opinion, in 1964,22 adopted a similar approach, and
elaborated the criteria for identifying lease agreements in the form of
installment purchases. The later opinion requires the appropriate fig-
ures to be included in the balance sheet itself, thereby eliminating the
previous alternative of disclosure in notes appended to the financial
statements.
Published statistics do not demonstrate whether these recommenda-
tions have been implemented fully2s The author's inquiries of col-
leagues in the accounting field leave him with the impression that a
tendency remains for many corporations to exclude leasing obligations
from their balance sheets or notes thereto wherever possible within the
considerable area left open for interpretation under the 1964 opinion.
The implication is that, despite greater awareness among lending insti-
tutions of the existence of these practices, some corporations are none-
theless able to obtain advantages in terms of finance, trade, or prestige.
Therefore, these financing reasons remain an influential factor in deter-
mining whether or not to acquire equipment by leasing.
Where a company's existing loan agreements contain restrictive
covenants limiting further borrowing under formulae related to balance
sheet ratios, these restrictions may be avoided by leasing. However, it
would appear that most draftsmen of loan agreements now close this
loophole.
The taxation and accounting advantages of leasing serve no useful
function other than saving the lessee money. However, the existence
of other reasons for leasing, totally unrelated to security, indicate that
21. APB ACCoumnG PrNciPLEs, AccomuNG RESEARCH BurL. No. 38, Disclosure of
Long-Term Leases in Financial Statements of Lessees (1949) (re-issued in almost iden-
tical form in 1953 as Chapter 14 of Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43).
22. APB Accoumimn PRINCIPLES, AccoUNTING PRiNCIPes BoAm OpImION No. 5,
Reporting of Leases in Financial Statements of Lessee (1964).
23. A comparison of the annual surveys of accounting trends and techniques adopted
by 600 survey companies shows an increase in the number of firms reporting the
existence of leases which they treated as purchases or sale and lease-back transactions.
The surveys also show a trend toward more adequate disclosure of detailed information
regarding long-term leases. See generally AICPA, AccoUNmNG TRaNDs aN TEcHmQUEs,
ANuA1L Smwvry (1965-70). However, these surveys do not offer any qualitative analysis
of the degree of compliance with the test established by the Accounting Principles
Board.
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a lease can perform a useful economic function. Each reason 24 will be
examined to ascertain whether its function could be performed equally
well by a true lease, a lease with option to purchase, a conditional sale,
or a chattel mortgage.
Other Reasons
1. Special Situations
Despite the slight edge in terms of net cash outlay in favor of using
loan capital to finance a purchase rather than leasing,25 in a number of
special situations leasing offers particular advantages.
(a) In specialized industries where income is directly related to
equipment, e.g., trucking, and in high volume merchandising where profit
is directly related to the amount of capital freed for acquisition of in-
ventory, leasing makes good business sense. Likewise, in industries
utilizing equipment with a high capital cost for only limited periods of
time, leasing provides a sound solution.
In each of these instances, the true lease is the only transaction which
serves the purpose indicated, namely to conserve capital. The lessee
desires to pay for the use of the equipment, not for the asset itself,
which, in economic terms, is merely a necessary evil. An option to
purchase at market value may be built into the lease without destroying
this objective, but a conditional sale or sale subject to a chattel mort-
gage would defeat the purpose.
(b) Where the need for equipment is only temporary, the true
lease will be the most economic method, since the acquisition of an
equity is contrary to the lessee's needs.
(c) Where equipment can be utilized to maximum capacity on a
farm-out basis among a number of distinct users, the true lease again
may prove economic. The fact that the various users are not acting
jointly or in the same interest precludes any possibility of the acquisi-
tion of an equity in the equipment. It is only the use of the equipment
which can be divided on a time-sharing basis.
(d) Where equipment represents a new, untried invention or its
suitability for the lessee's requirements is unproven, a short-term true
lease affords the lessee greater flexibility and leaves the risk of failure
or obsolescence largely with the lessor. The lessee does not wish to
24. A fuller discussion of relative advantages and disadvantages may be found in
Boothe, supra note 15; Griesinger, supra note 3; Myers, supra note 18, at 83-94; Wither-
by, supra note 17, at 99-102; Comment, supra note 14.
25. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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invest heavily in acquiring an equity in equipment which may prove
unsuitable. However, depending upon the lessee's assessment of the
potential of the equipment and the possibility of its value becoming
inflated should its utility be established, the lessee may wish to pay a
higher current rental to obtain an option of renewal or purchase at
current market price. This may be regarded more as an insurance
premium than as the acquisition of a normal proprietary interest in
the equipment.
(e) Where the lessee is a small business with a low credit rating, a
true lease or lease with an option to purchase may be the only means
available to obtain the equipment. A recent unpublished study, Lease
Financing and Small Business, by Professor Lee Johnson of the Gradu-
ate School of Business at the University of Virginia, confirmed that
small businesses may be unable to obtain straight debt financing for
equipment no matter how high an interest rate they are willing to pay.
This is particularly true in service industries utilizing high cost equip-
ment but without other fixed assets.2 The alternatives are leasing or
equity financing.
Where leasing is chosen, the lessor, usually a specialist leasing com-
pany independent of the manufacturer or supplier, acts as a catalyst
in the financing function. Often the lessor will obtain its financing from
the lessee's bank, even though the bank would not have financed a
purchase of the equipment by the lessee. The reason is that the bank
obtains two party paper and acquires a claim against the lessor's total
assets, thereby spreading its risk. WVhile the interest rate typically
charged by the lessor will be higher than the rate for prime credit debt
borrowings, it will not be as high as if the lessee had adopted the only
remaining alternative of equity financing.27 In effect, the lessor offers
a hybrid form of financing, debt coupled with a limited equity partici-
pation in the residual value of the specific equipment financed, as dis-
tinct from general equity participation in the entire operation of the
lessee corporation.
(f) While the borrowing capacity of most corporations is geared
to their general credit rather than the fixed assets available as security,
corporations engaged in service industries with few, if any, capital
assets to offer as security may be able to lease where they could not
borrow. Most corporations can borrow 100 percent of the capital
26. Professor Johnson's case studies involved corporations engaged in job printing,
industrial job plating, and commercial film processing.
27. Interview with Lee Johnson, Professor, University of Virginia, December, 1970.
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cost of new equipment by reliance upon their other assets and general
credit. However, in the limited situation mentioned above, leasing
affords the only means of financing the total cost of equipment. If
this particular lessee also has a liquidity problem, equipment can be
leased on a smaller down payment than is necessary under a conditional
sale.
In the situations outlined in paragraphs (e) and (f) the low credit
rating and borrowing capacity exclude forms of financing other than
leasing. However, the lessee often has a choice between a true lease and
a lease with option of purchase. To the extent that the rental payments
include a payment of capital toward the purchase of the equipment,
both the total quantity of equipment which may be leased by the lessee
and its liquidity will suffer.
(g) Certain commodities can be acquired at a lesser cost when pur-
chased in bulk by a lessor company, and therefore can be leased to
individual corporations at rates which compare favorably with normal
cash prices. The typical example is the leasing of fleets of motor ve-
hicles. In theory, it would seem that the overhead costs of the lessor's
distribution functions would be just as high as any retail distributor,
and hence there would be no additional savings. However, the success
of lessors in this field evidences both the validity of the underlying
economies attributable to the favorable borrowing terms available to
the lessors themselves, and the savings in administrative cost achieved
by handling, licensing, tax reporting, registration, depreciation, and
maintenance on a volume basis.28 These benefits are available in a true
lease or lease with option to purchase. In the conditional sale or chattel
mortgage situation, however, the administrative savings of the package
lease are not obtained because the burden of performing these functions
falls directly upon the user.
2. Tying Agreements
Suppliers of some equipment will make it available on no other basis
than by leasing. In the past, leasing may have been regarded as a more
effective vehicle for the lessor to enforce tying arrangements as to
service, replacement parts, and materials to be used with the equipment.
Once the equipment has become the property of the buyer, whether
under a conditional sale or by exercise of an option to purchase under
a lease, the seller can no longer use the power of repossession for breach
as leverage for enforcing such tying arrangements. The threat of re-
28. Boothe, supra note 15, at 9.
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fusal to supply new equipment in the future remains, but may be of
less significance to the buyer. However, this analysis is materially
affected by the application of the anti-trust laws in several respects.
First, if the lessor
has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product
[equipment] to restrain free competition in the market for the
tied product to some degree, and a not "insubstantial" amount of
interstate commerce is affected, tying contracts will almost cer-
tainly2
be held illegal under either section 3 of the Clayton Act or section 1
of the Sherman Act. If the tying arrangement is used to monopolize a
market, section 2 of the Sherman Act may also be infringed.30 While
a number of the leading cases involving tying have involved equipment
leases,31 the language and purpose of the Clayton and Sherman provi-
sions also extend to purchases.
Second, refusal to supply a manufacturer who has previously infringed
a tying arrangement is itself subject to an action for treble damages
under the antitrust laws.3 2 Therefore, in industries and markets where
a lessor has substantial market power and/or the lessee may suffer dam-
age through refusal of supplies, the antitrust laws will tend to elimi-
nate any advantage which a leasing arrangement may afford a supplier
in contrast to a conditional or outright sale.
3. Human Factors
Certain human psychological and emotional factors deserve brief
mention. The pride of ownership had more meaning in times of
smaller businesses and corporations which remained the personal pre-
serve of their founders. Today, control of many public corporations
is vested in managements whose criteria for measuring success are earn-
29. A. NALE, THE AWTRusT LAWS OF THE U.SA. 215 (1970). The courts have not
always applied a per se rule, but have upheld tying arrangements where justified by the
rule of reason. Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (ist Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp.
545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
S0. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp, 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curimn, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
31. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); International Busi-
ness Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); United Shoe Machinery
Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
32. Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993
(1964); Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960).
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ings ratios and the standing of their corporation's securities on stock
exchanges.
There are reported instances of subordinate corporate and govern-
ment officials adopting leasing to avoid the need to seek approval for
purchases under internal purchasing controls.3 3 In the smaller company,
leasing may also be simpler and less time-consuming for the business
executive than negotiating a term loan to finance the purchase of equip-
ment. Subsequent procedures for reporting to the lessor are also sim-
pler and less costly than complying with procedures required under
term loan agreements.
4. Summary
The following tentative conclusions are offered as the result of the
foregoing analysis. There are a number of legitimate business and eco-
nomic reasons for leasing transactions. However, tax reasons are un-
likely to predominate in many cases, and accounting advantages are
only available because of incomplete financial reporting and analysis.
In most of the special situations referred to, the benefits accruing to the
lessee can be achieved by a true lease, and often this is the only means
of maximizing the business objectives of the lessee. In the case of tying
arrangements, the lessor's objectives can best be achieved by a true lease.
In those cases where the anti-trust laws will prevent the lessor from
achieving those objectives, it is immaterial whether the transaction is
cast in the form of lease or sale.
Therefore, one is virtually forced to the conclusion that in many
leases (other than true leases) one objective, probably the primary one,
is to enable the lessee to acquire an equity in the equipment while re-
serving to the lessor the protections of ownership as security. Since this
is precisely the purpose of the conditional sale and chattel mortgage
which are treated as security agreements under Article 9, there is at
least a prima facie case for arguing that in any lease under which the
lessee is acquiring an equity, the intention that it should operate by
way of security should be implied.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CODE DISTINcTION BETWEEN
TRUE LEASES AND LEASES INTENDED AS SECURITY
The Code definition of security interest includes title reserved under
a lease "intended as security," thus equating such a lease with other
83. Comment, supra note 14, at 763 n.57.
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personal property security agreements.34 The definition distinguishes
true leases, which are not intended as security, and excludes them from
the operation of the Code. Before examining the details of the defini-
tion, the importance of the distinction may be illustrated by noting the
consequences of a determination that a particular lease is a security
agreement.35 The analysis will be confined to the lease transaction it-
self. Of course, the lessor very often uses either the lease or the equip-
ment itself as collateral in obtaining its own financing. Irrespective of
whether the lease agreement is a true lease or a security agreement, it
constitutes chattel paper.3" Therefore, any dealing with the lease by
the lessor, whether as collateral for a pledge or by outright sale, will
create a security interest under Article 9.37 If the lessor uses the equip-
ment as collateral a security interest is created, but this is not so in the
case of a sale.
Perfection and Priority
The obvious but most important consequence of this classification is
that a lease held to be a security agreement will be subject to the per-
fection and priority provisions of Article 9. If a financing statement is
not filed under section 9-402, the lessor's tide to the equipment will be
subordinated to persons who become lien creditors or receive delivery
of the equipment for value as transferees in bulk, if such persons were
without knowledge of the lessor's interest.38 If the lease qualifies as a
purchase money security interest,39 as it normally would, and if the
lessor files within 10 days after the collateral comes into the lessee's
possession, he will still prevail over an intervening lien creditor.4° A
lessor of either farm equipment having a purchase price not exceeding
$2500 or of consumer goods is excused from filing in relation to his
purchase money security interest in the goods 4' There is no such
34. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
35. Security agreement is defined in U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (h) as "an agreement which
creates or provides for a security interest."
36. U.C.C. § 9-105.
37. The interest can be perfected by filing a financing statement or taking possession
of the lease agreement. U.C.C. § 9-305. To prevent a subsequent purchaser of the
lease agreement from obtaining priority under section 9-308, the assignee should take
possession of the lease agreement.
38. U.C.C. § 9-301 (1) (b), (c); § 9-301(3); and Art. 6.
39. Defined in U.C.C. § 9-107.
40. U.C.C. § 9-301(2).
41. U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (c), (d). Filing is required where the farm equipment or con-
sumer goods are fixtures or are motor vehicles required to be licensed.
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exception in the case of equipment used or bought for use primarily
in a business or profession. 2
Encumbrance of Equipment by Lessee
If an equipment lessee purports to pledge or otherwise encumber the
equipment, the result may be markedly different according to whether
the common law or the Code applies. The lessee's position under a
common law lease is governed by the nemo dat qui non habet rule.
If the lease effectively reserves to the lessor the property in the equip-
ment, the lessee has no property right in the goods which he can en-
cumber. The lessee's interest in the lease agreement is a chose in action,
a general intangible under section 9-106, which he may offer as secur-
ity but in which the secured party can acquire no stronger position
than the lessee; it may be weaker where, for example, the lease pur-
ports to prohibit, or condition default upon, the attempted encumbrance.
In this case, the encumbrancer could still file a financing statement
in order to protect his position against creditors who might acquire
subsequent claims over the lessee's interest. Since Article 9 also permits
a party to file a financing statement prior to the attachment of a secur-
ity interest,4z a party wishing to take a security interest in the lessee's
equipment could obtain a security agreement and file a financing state-
ment in the expectation that the lessee might exercise an option to pur-
chase the equipment. However, the security interest could not attach
until the lessee obtained rights to the equipment, and in the ordinary
course this would only take place when the lessee acquired tide to the
equipment by fulfilling his obligations to the lessor.44
Where the lease is governed by Article 9, the reservation of title
by a lessor who omits to file will be ineffective against a creditor of
the lessee who takes security over the lessee's interest in the same equip-
ment, provided this creditor has perfected either by filing or taking
possession." The appropriate priority rule, section 9-312(5) (b), ap-
plies regardless of the respective times of attachment. If the creditor
42. Where goods are used for several purposes, the test to be applied is which use
is the primary one. The classifications in section 9-109 are mutually exclusive and the
same goods cannot at the same time fall into more than one class. U.C.G. § 9-109,
comment 2.
43. U.C.C. § 9-402(1).
44. A similar result is obtained under the English common law doctrine of "feeding
the title" or "feeding the estoppel." See Patten v. Thomas Motors Pry. Ltd. 83 W.N.
(Pt.2) (N.S.W.) 378 (1965); Butterwofth v. Kingsway Motors [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1286.
45. U.C.C. § 9-312 (5) (b).
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fails to file, priority is governed by the time of attachment,4 and hence
the lessor retains his priority. Furthermore, section 9-307 will have no
application, since the terms "buyer in the ordinary course of business"
and "buying" are defined in such a way as to exclude other dispositions
of a security nature.4 7
Whether a bailment by a lessee under a true lease to an artisan for
the purpose of repair or improvement will give rise to a lien which will
be preferred to the lessor's interest depends upon the statutory and
common law rules of each state. In the absence of statute, it has been
generally held that the artisan's lien is not effective against the owner
who has not authorized the work.48 However, some state statutes pro-
vide that a lien will arise when the work is performed at the request
of the owner, his authorized agent, or a lawful possessor49 of the goods.
In the latter case the artisan's lien will prevail over the lessor's interest.
When the lease creates a security interest, section 9-310 will apply.
This section provides that an artisan's lien upon goods in his possession
given by statute or rule of law takes priority over a perfected security
interest, unless the lien is statutory and the statute expressly provides
otherwise. A lien may be created over equipment leased under an
Article 9 lease in two situations:
(a) by virtue of a state statute. Unless the statute provides other-
wise, section 9-310 will prefer the artisan's lien to the lessor's perfected
security interest,50 and, a fortiori, it is submitted, to a lessee's unper-
fected security interest. In the latter case, the same result would flow
from the common law principles.51
'(b) by virtue of the lessor's express or implied authority, under the
general principles of agency. In the absence of any contrary agree-
46. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (c). In this case it may be that the creditor's security never
attaches to the equipment since the debtor has no rights in the collateral unless he
exercises an option to purchase. U.C.C. § 9-204(1).
47. U.C.C. § 1-201(9). Contrast the definition of "purchase" and "purchaser" in
section 1-201(32), (33).
48. In re Midwest Livestock Commission Co., 292 F. Supp. 955, 960 (D. Nev. 1967)
and other cases cited in 8 C.J.S. Bailmnents § 35(a) n.60 (1962).
49. E.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 3051 (West 1954); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-2 (1950); Lee,
Liens on Personal Property Not Governed by the Uniform Conmzercial Code, 44
N.CL. Rv. 322, 337 (1966).
50. However, if the lessor has perfected by taking possession, his security interest
will prevail since the artisan's lien is terminated by loss of possession, assuming of
course that the artisan voluntarily surrendered possession.
51. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
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ment, section 9-310 will again prefer the artisan's lien. 52 However, in
appropriate situations, the lessor should require, as a pre-condition to
his authorization, a subordination agreement from the artisan, as con-
templated by section 9-316.
Therefore, on the lien issue, no materially different result arises by
virtue of a determination that a lease does or does not create a security
interest.
Sale of Equipment by Lessee
The Code provisions have no effect upon the inability of an equip-
ment lessee to convey title to a third party. Outside of the Code, the
nemo dat qui non habet rule precludes a lessee from passing title to
a third party, no matter how bona fide the purchaser may be. In the
absence of special circumstances creating an estoppel, or unless the
lessee is a merchant,53 mere possession is not evidence of ownership so
as to enable the purchaser to prevail against the owner. 4 If the lease
is subject to Article 9, a buyer of goods from a lessee could take free
of the lessor's title in two limited situations.
(a) The first instance is where a buyer in the ordinary course of
business buys goods "in good faith and without knowledge that the
sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest
of a third party" from a lessee who was "in the business of selling
52. For a comparison with English and Australian statutory and common law rules,
see Peden, The Creation of Common Law Liens, 18 INT'L. & COMp. L.Q. 129 (1969).
53. U.C.C. § 2-403 (2).
54. It is no doubt true that possession of personal property is some evidence of
ownership, and may be sufficient in a given case to protect one dealing with
the property as that of possessor. But mere possession, unaccompanied by
other circumstances giving it a specific character or creating an estoppel,
is not such evidence of ownership as to prevail against the true owner,
except in cases of negotiable instruments, mortgaged chattel property, or
that sold under conditional sales agreements.
The rule that one cannot be divested of his property without his con-
sent, and the principle that one cannot possess or convey a greater title
than he himself has, controls all questions arising as to personal property
attempted to be transferred or as to lien created thereon. The effect of
possession as evidence of ownership is subordinate to these principles, save
in the exceptions noted. The mere fact of one putting property into the
charge or custody of another does not divest the possession of the true
owner; the legal possession still remains in the owner, for the agent, bailee
or lessee thereof can have no greater title than his grant provides.
Cooperider v. Myre, 37 Ohio App. 502, 505, 175 N.E. 235, 236 (1930).
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goods of that kind." " The result is the same whether or not the secur-
ity interest is perfected. However, such a situation is unlikely to arise,
since a merchant does not usually take on lease equipment of the kind
which he also holds as inventory for sale in the course of his business.
In this context, the term equipment has been used in its ordinary non-
Code meaning. However, an interesting point arises out of the distinc-
tion between the definitions of equipment and inventory under the
Code."6 Where a leasing company has given a security interest over the
inventory which it holds available for sale or lease, the financing state-
ment should refer to the collateral as inventory. However, once an item
is leased, it may be argued that it falls outside the definition of inventory
and therefore becomes equipment since it is no longer goods held for
sale or lease.57 This argument has been advanced by Fairfax Leary,
tentatively at first,5 but later more forcefully. 59
It is submitted, and I think Mr. Leary would probably agree, that
inventory remains inventory if it has been leased under a true lease,
since the title to the goods remains with the lessor who therefore
arguably continues to "hold them for sale or lease." This may also be
the position where the lease is intended as security so long as the lessor
retains title, because the lessee has not exercised his option to purchase.
Once this option is exercised, of course, the security interest in the
inventory is converted to a security interest in the proceeds. To avoid
any possible doubt, the financer of a dealer who holds stock for sale
and lease should file a financing statement covering the goods "whether
as equipment or as inventory and proceeds thereof."
It is also submitted that the courts should have regard for the fact
55. U.C.C. § 9-307(1), § 1-201(9). The same result could be reached under section
2-403 (2).
56. These classifications are defined in U.C.C. § 9-109.
57. A similar ambiguity arises in the definition of inventory in the Personal Property
Security Act of 1967, § 1(n) (Ont.).
58. PaOCarnNGs OF THE FIsr A1NuAL UNiFORM COMmERCIAL CODE INsnrrUT, Lease
Financing and Other Techniques of Financing Equipment Under the U.C.C., 113, 117-
18 (1967).
59. Leary, Leasing and Other Techniques of Financing Equipment Under the U.C.C.,
42 Tnz, rwa L.Q. 217, 228 (1969). The question is of limited practical significance, and
would only be likely to arise where a lessee makes a sale which purports to be in the
ordinary course of business. Mr. Leary suggests that where goods have been leased
and therefore arguably become equipment, the financer of the lessor would retain pri-
ority for its purchase money security interest without the need to notify prior finan-
cers, as is necessary in the case of inventory under section 9-312(3). The author would
suggest that if the goods are inventory when received by the lessor, this classification
governs and section 9-312(3), rather than section 9-312(2), applies, irrespective of
whether the goods later become equipment.
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that in most instances new equipment is delivered directly by the manu-
facturer to the lessee, although property in the goods is passed to the
lessor company. Since the possession of this equipment has never been
physically held by the lessor, more weight accrues to the argument
that the definition of inventory turns upon whether the lessor holds and
retains title. Any other conclusion would exclude all leased goods from
the "inventory" of lessor companies.
(b) The second situation is where a buyer buys farm equipment
having an original purchase price not in excess of $2,500 (other than
fixtures) or consumer goods, without knowledge of the lessor's interest,
for value and for his own farming operations or his own personal,
family, or household purposes60 If the lessor had filed a financing
statement before the purchase took place, his interest would prevail.0 1
These circumstances would not extend to a sale of equipment used as
such by the lessee, since the lessee's use, rather than the use intended by
the buyer from the lessee, determines the classification. In other words,
section 9-307(2) only applies to a purchase by a consumer or farmer
from a consumer or farmer.
62
Dealing 'with the Lessee's Interest
Prior to the introduction of the Code, some jurisdictions precluded
creditors of the mortgagor or conditional vendee from proceeding
against the mortgagor's or vendee's interest by levy or other judicial
process.es Other jurisdictions specifically sanctioned such levy, not-
withstanding any prohibition in the security agreement.6 Most juris-
dictions permitted the debtor voluntarily to transfer his equity in goods,
but required him to notify the creditor of such transfer.6 5 A lease, under
which the lessee has acquired an equity, would probably have been
60. U.C.C. § 9-307(2).
61. The buyer would still be entitled to the interest or equity of the lessee in the
equipment. The lessee's power to transfer his rights to the collateral, voluntarily or
involuntarily, cannot be excluded by a lease subject to Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-311.
A similar provision exists in the Australian statutes regulating hire-purchase agreements.
Uniform Hire Purchase Act, § 9. The English Court of Appeal has reached a similar
result without the aid of a statutory provision. Wickham Holdings Ltd. v. Brooke
House Motors Ltd. [1967] 1 W.LR. 295. For a general discussion of this question under
English and Australian law see Peden, Measure of Damages in Conversion and Detinue,
44 AusmL. LJ. 65 (1970).
62. Everett National Bank v. Deschuiteneer, 109 N.H. 112, 244 A.2d 196 (1968).
63. U.C.C. § 9-311, comment 2.
64. E.g., Farrow v. Ocean County Trust Co., 121 N.JL_. 344, 2 A.2d 352 (Sup. Ct.
1938; CAL. CODE Civ. PRO. § 689a (West 1967).
65. E.g., CoLO. Sass. LAws, 1961, ch. 87, § 7.
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treated as analogous to a conditional sale, but under a true lease the
lessee would have had no equity to transfer. Since the lease invariably
provided that any attempted disposition or parting with possession
constituted default, an assignee of the lessee's interest acquired no
rights against a non-consenting lessor.
Since the introduction of section 9-311 of the Code., a lessee's in-
terest under a lease which is subject to Article 9 can be voluntarily or
involuntarily transferred, notwithstanding a provision in the security
agreement prohibiting such transfer. In those jurisdictions in which such
a prohibition was effective under the pre-Code law, it will be relevant
to determine whether or not a lease is subject to Article 9.
Lessor's Remedies
The remedies of a lessor upon the lessee's default and the corre-
sponding rights of the lessee to redeem such default will vary accord-
ing to whether the lease is regarded as a security agreement under
Article 9 or a true lease.66 Where the agreement is outside Article 9,
the lessor's remedies are found in the law of bailments. Where Article
9 applies, Part V dealing with remedies is theoretically applicable but
appears inappropriate in certain fact situations.
The lessor's remedies may be briefly summarized as follows:
1. Repossession of the Equipment Upon Default
This remedy is the same whether or not the Code applies, and de-
fault is left to be defined by the agreement. Under the Code, the
secured party can only proceed to repossess without judicial process
if the repossession can be accomplished without breach of the peace.'-
Since the Code does not define breach of the peace, the common law
principles will apply." In the case of a true lease, the common law of
the various states has not always been in harmony:
[S] ome courts [hold] that the owner of property is only liable
for excessive force in retaking his property; that he may use such
66. See Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the U.C.C., 47
MiNN. L. R~v. 205 (1962); Comment Leases: Security Interests: Uniform Cornzercial
Code: Matter of Royer's Bakery, Inc. (No. 2), 4 CCH Installment Credit Guide
99274, at 89 31 (E.D. Pa. 1963); United Rental Equip. Co. v. Potts & Callahan Contract-
ing Co. 251 Md. 552, 191 A2d 570 (1963), 49 Commss. L.Q., 672, 677-79 (1964).
67. U.C.C. § 9-503.
68. See Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114, 54 Misc. 2d 277, aff'd, 288
N.Y.S.2d 862 (1968). -
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force as is reasonably necessary to overcome the resistance wrong-
fully interposed. Others hold that where opposition is offered
to the retaking of the property the owner must resort to the reme-
dies offered by proceedings at law. 69
However, the view which appears to have prevailed is expressed in
the following terms:
We think that the correct view is that where possession of prop-
erty has been lawfully acquired as by a conditional sale or bail-
ment and the agreement between the parties allows the owner to
retake when certain conditions arise he may retake if he can do so
without force, but when the taling is resisted he may not use
force, he must have his remedy by proceedings at law.70
On this point, the common law draws no distinction between a pure
lease, a lease intended as security, or a conditional sale. In addition, the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act section 16, some chattel mortgage stat-
utes, and some other personal property security legislation 7' adopted a
rule similar to that prevailing at common law and now adopted uni-
formly in Article 9. Similar issues arise in relation to the right of the
lessor to enter another person's land or premises in order to repossess his
goods. These are resolved solely by reference to the common law. 72
2. Claim for damages for unpaid rentals
The lessor must give credit to the lessee in appropriate cases for the
value of the goods upon repossession. 3 If the lease provides for pay-
ment on default of the total rent for the unexpired period of the lease,
the courts are likely to strike the provision down as a penalty,74 unless
it bears a reasonable relationship to the damages suffered.7 5 There is
69. Abel v. M.H. Pickering Co., 58 Pa. Super. 439, 446 (1914).
70. Id. at 446-47. This statement was approved in Stewart v. F.A. North Co, 65
Pa. Super. 195 (1916). See also Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934)
and cases cited therein.
71. E.g., Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, 69 P.S. § 615g (1965).
72. See Hogan, supra note 66, at 244.
73. E.g., Electrical Prods. Consol. v. Sweet, 83 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1936); Rentways, Inc.
v. O'Neill Milk & Cream Co., 282 App. Div. 924, 125 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1st Dep't. 1953),
aft'd, 308 N.Y. 342, 126 N.E.2d 271 (1955).
74. Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224 (1930); Witherby, supra note 17, at
136-39.
75. Irving Trust Co. v. Perry, 293 U.S. 307 (1934).
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nothing in section 9-504 to alter this position, which is, if anything,
strengthened by the good faith provisions of the Code.76
This position may also be reinforced by section 9-506 and the com-
ment thereto. Section 9-506 provides that: "[T]he debtor may . . .
redeem the collateral by tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured
by the collateral . .." The comment suggests that "tendering ful-
fillment" is confined to the "payment in full of all monetary obligations
then due and performance in full of all other obligations then matured."
(Emphasis supplied). Unmatured obligations are to remain secured,
thereby implying that they are only to mature with the effluxion of time
in accordance with the normal (not the default) provisions of the se-
curity agreement. 7
The Code specifically makes all the secured party's remedies cumula-
tive,78 thus avoiding the danger of compelling a lessor to elect between
these first two remedies of repossession or action for the rental obligation
as has sometimes been the case in conditional sales contracts.79
The proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code limits provisions for
additional payments on default in certain lease transactions. However,
these limitations apply only to consumer credit sales8° and consumer
credit loans, and not to consumer leases."' The Credit Code does not
prescribe rate ceilings for leases. The distinction drawn between a sale
and lease under the Credit Code is similar to that under the Uniform
Commercial Code in that a sale includes:
[A]ny agreement in the form of a bailment or lease if the bailee
or lessee agrees to pay as compensation for use a sum substantially
equivalent to or in excess of the aggregate value of the goods in-
volved and it is agreed that the bailee or lessee will become, or for
no other or a nominal consideration has the option to become, the
owner of the goods upon full compliance with his obligations
under the agreement.8 2
76. U.C.C. §§1-201(19), 1-208.
77. Professor Hogan appears to have overlooked the italicized portion of the Comment
quoted above, and also the subsequent sentence in the Comment dealing with unma-
tured obligations. Hogan, supra note 66, at 239 n.159.
78. U.C.C. § 9-501 (1).
79. Warren, Statutory Damages and the Conditional Sale, 20 Owo ST. LJ. 289, 291
(1951).
80. UtMFoRMv CONSUMER CREWIT CoDE §§ 2-210, 2-414 (hereinafter cited as U.C.C.C.).
81. U.C.C.C. §§ 3-210, 3-405.
82. U.C.C.C. § 2-105 (4).
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Similarly, the federal Truth in Lending Act does not require dis-
closure of finance charges or rates in the case of true leases because of
the difficulty of evolving a practical method of regulating disclosure.83
3. Retention or Sale of the Equipment Following Repossession
In the case of a true lease not subject to Article 9, repossession upon
default terminates the lease and restores to the lessor full possessory
rights in addition to the proprietary rights, which are retained through-
out. The lessor has absolute discretion to retain the equipment, and
there is no obligation to resell or re-lease the equipment. The only
qualification upon this statement is that in computing any damages
against the lessee, the courts through the common law principle of miti-
gation will assume that after repossession the lessor obtained market
value for the equipment, either as rental or purchase price.
4. Rights of Secured Parties
Under a lease subject to Article 9, the secured party's rights are quali-
fied in several respects.
First, if the collateral is consumer goods, and the debtor has paid
60 percent of the purchase price, the secured party is obliged to resell
within 90 days. 4 Since the definitions of consumer goods and equip-
ment are mutually exclusive, 5 this provision cannot apply in the case
of an equipment lease, even though such lease is intended as security.
Nonetheless, the debtor or any secured third party whose security in-
terest is recorded by a financing statement can force the secured party
to resell.86
Second, the debtor or any secured third party is given a statutory
right of redemption by tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured
by the collateral together with the secured party's expenses.8 7 Such a
right does not exist in the case of a true lease which can be terminated
absolutely by the non-defaulting party upon the other's breach.
Third, where the secured party is obliged to resell or voluntarily re-
83. Except for inconsequential contextual differences, the same definition has been
adopted in the federal Truth in Lending Act for the term "credit sale" as has been
applied to consumer credit sales in the U.C.C.C. Truth in Lending Act, Act of May 29,
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 103(g), 82 Stat. 146; 12 C.F.R. § '26.2(n) (1971).
84. U.C.C. § 9-505. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code does not impose any addi-
tional obligations as to the resale of consumer goods following repossession.
85. U.C.C. § 9-109.
86. U.C.C. § 9-505 (2).
87. U.C.C. § 9-506.
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sells the equipment, the manner in which he resells is regulated by the
procedures laid down in section 9-504, which embodies the standard of
commercial reasonableness contained in section 9-507. The purpose of
these provisions is to substitute for the previous rigid requirements a
standard which is sufficiently flexible to enable the economic interests
of the debtor to be best served. The lack of specificity in the term
"commercially reasonable" should not prevent effective and intelligent
application of the standard by the courts.88
Fourth, in addition to providing that the proceeds from the sale of
collateral shall be applied to the secured party's realization expenses,
satisfaction of the indebtedness secured by the security interest and of
indebtedness secured by subordinate security interests, section 9-504
requires that the secured party must account for any surplus to the
debtor. In the case of a security interest in goods, including equipment,
this right cannot be waived. This situation is unlikely to arise very often
because of the planned obsolescence of most equipment. 9 Where the
lessee's equity exceeds the realization value, the economic realities of the
situation make it unlikely that the lessee will allow the lessor to proceed
to resell, since a default sale, together with selling and legal expenses, is
unlikely in these circumstances to yield the maximum amount, despite
the requirements of commercial reasonableness. In spite of the antici-
pated rarity of these situations, the distinction between a true lease and
a lease intended as security retains theoretical significance under section
9-504, since a lessor in a true lease is not obliged to account to the lessee.
It has been suggested by Goode and Ziegel90 that the Article 9 reme-
dies are not appropriately drafted for some leases which fall within its
scope as leases intended as security. They maintain that difficulties arise
because these remedy provisions are based upon the assumption that the
debtor is ultimately obligated to pay the whole price or debt, and point
specifically to sections 9-504 and 9-506 in these terms:
Section 9-504 entitles the secured party, after repossession and
sale, to recover any deficiency. How is this rule to be applied in
a case such as the Royer's Bakery case, where the lessee was never
obligated to pay the price and could terminate the lease at any
time without further liability? Again, Section 9-506 entitles the
debtor to redeem on tendering fulfillment of "all obligations se-
cured by the collateral." What can redemption denote in this con-
88. Hogan, supra note 66, at 220 et seq.
89. Comment, supra note 66, at 679.
90. R. GOODE & J. Zm m, HIRm-PuRmAsE Am CoNDinioNAL SAr;E (1966).
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text? Surely it cannot mean that the debtor is entitled to have
the property vested in him if he has paid simply the rentals up to
the date of termination of the lease. Yet in the above case that
was the extent of his obligation.9
It would seem that section 9-504 raises no problem, since it only im-
poses a liability upon the debtor if the security interest secures an in-
debtedness. It does no more than entitle the secured party to enforce
its rights under the agreement. In a case such as Royer's Bakery, this
would be confined to unpaid rentals up to the time of repossession.
In a similar situation, section 9-506 would be interpreted as entitling
the debtor to redeem its interest in the collateral upon payment of all
obligations then due. Admittedly, the section refers to redeeming "the
collateral," but it hardly seems too difficult an exercise in statutory in-
terpretation to imply the qualification suggested above.
The above analysis of true leases and leases intended as security has
shown that the only consequences of this distinction which are crucial
are the first two, namely invalidation, as against the lessee's lien creditors
or other secured creditors, of unperfected leases creating security in-
terests. These results, coupled with the incentive thereby created to
file and hence to give notice to other creditors of the lessee of its limited
interest in equipment in its possession and apparent ownership, appear
as the consistent policy of Article 9. Since the primary purpose of in-
clusion of equipment leases within the scope of Article 9 is the notifica-
tion and protection of the lessee's other creditors, one may inquire why
these creditors are not equally entitled to protection in the case of a true
lease. Whether the line should be drawn at this point is a question which
can be more adequately considered after an examination of the present
definition of security interest in the Code and the manner in which this
definition has been interpreted by the courts.
ANALYSIS OF THE CODE DEFINITION OF SECURITY INTEREST
The term security interest is defifed in section 1-201 (37) as "an in-
terest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or per-
formance of an obligation." Section 9-102 takes up this definition in
delimiting the scope of Article 9 as applying "to any transaction (re-
gardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in
91. Id. at 145 n.41.
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personal property or fixtures." Security agreement is defined to mean
an agreement which creates or provides for a security interest.9
Goode and Ziegel point out that not every lease intended as security
will create a security interest, and that some leases, though not creating
a security interest nor constituting security agreements, nonetheless
fall within section 9-102 and hence are governed by Article 9 as a
whole. 3 The author believes that these learned scholars have not done
justice to the Code draftsmen. The primary scope section in Article 9
is 9-102. The definitions in 1-201 (37) and 9-105 are merely interpretive
and subsidiary. It is conceded that a lease intended as security may not
create a security interest as defined in 1-201 (37) because payment of
performance of an obligation is not secured by an interest in personal
property. Conversely, reservation of title under a lease will not be re-
garded as a security interest unless the lease is intended as security. Both
elements, the actual securing of payment or performance of an obliga-
tion upon an interest in personal property and the intention that the
lease shall operate as security, are necessary for a lease to create a security
interest under the 1-201 (37) definition.
However, the criterion for the applicability of Article 9 set forth in
9-102 is not whether a transaction is intended as a security but whether
it is intended to create a security interest in personal property or fix-
tures. Similarly, a security agreement is not an agreement intended as
security but one which creates or provides for a security interest. 4
Goode and Ziegel rely on the alleged distinction between the language
"intended to create a security interest" in 9-102(1) and "an interest
which [actually] secures payment of performance of an obligation" in
1-201 (37). The distinction turns upon the meaning of "a transaction
92. U.C.C. § 9-105 (1) (h).
93. The truth of the matter is that the Coda draftsmen have in their definitions
made an unhappy marriage of two inconsistent concepts. By section 9-105, a
security agreement is defined as "an agreement which creates or provides for
a security interest."' Section 1-201(37) defines a security interest as "an in-
terest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment of perform-
ance of an obligation." But by section 9-102, Article 9 is made applicable
to "any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a
security interest in personal property or fixtures." Hence a lease which,
though not in fact securing a debt or obligation, is "'intended as security"
(applying the canons of intention laid down in section 1-201(37)) falls
within section 9-102 so .as to be governed by Article 9 as a whole but does
not create a security interest for the purpose of section 1-201(37); nor,
apparently, does it constitute a security agreement within section 9-105!
R. GOODE & J. ZmGEL, supra note 90, at 145 n.41.
94. U.C.C § 9-105 (1) (h).
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which is intended to create a security interest" in 9-102(1). Where
such a transaction actually creates a security interest, it comes within
the 1-201(37) definition and Article 9. Where it intends but fails to
create a security interest, it will be outside 1-201 (37) but may still come
within 9-102(1) because of the intent. Goode and Ziegel assume that
it will.
An alternative approach is to interpret the relevant part of- section
9-102(1) as applicable only to any transaction (regardless of its form)
which is intended to (and does in fact) create a security interest. This
latter approach appears more consistent with the overall scheme and pur-
pose of the Code.
The Test of Intention
Most discussion and litigation concerning leases as security has re-
volved around that part of the definition of security interest which
adopts an intention test for leases and consignments. The first part of
this definition excludes a reservation of title in a lease which is not in-
tended as security.'- The definition then proceeds to set out three rules
for determining whether a lease is intended as security:
(a) whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the
facts of each case;
(b) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make the
lease one intended for security;
(c) an agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the lease
the lessee shall become or has the option to become the owner of the
property for no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration
does not make the lease one intended for security.
A lease will therefore create a security interest if:
(a) it secures payment or performance of an obligation upon per-
sonal property reserved by the lease; and
(b) the lease is intended as security. Such intention is to be de-
termined objectively on the basis of the facts of the case, so that the
parties' declarations of intention are not conclusive;
(c) where the lease includes an option to purchase:
(i) this is not of itself determinative as to the existence of a
security interest;
95. "Unless a lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of title there-
under is not a 'security interest . . . .'" U.C.C. § 1-201 (37).
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(ii) if the lessee can exercise this option for a nominal or no
additional consideration, the lease per se reserves a security
interest96
What is the relationship of the various divisions of this definition?
The intention of the parties is the primary test, but the definition im-
plies that the courts should look to the substance of the transaction
rather than to its form or the parties' verbal declarations of intention.
An objective test is indicated.
Where the parties expressly declare that their lease is intended as
security, a court would accept this declaration, since it cannot adversely
affect any third party. In the converse situation where such an intention
is expressly disclaimed,9 7 a court should still have regard to the other
terms of the transaction and surrounding circumstances to determine its
true purpose and effect. By adopting objective criteria, the courts have
actually moved toward a functional economic approach, rather than
adopting a distinction between sale and lease which is confined to the
legal issue of an obligation to purchase or the passage of title. This is in
accord with the policy of Article 9.
Facts relevant to an objective determination of the parties' intention
include length of the lease in relation to the economic life of the equip -
ment, relation of the lease rentals to market rental values, relation of the
option price to list price, relation of option price to anticipated or actual
depreciated value at the time the option is exercised, provision for
deduction of rentals from purchase price, requirement of a security de-
posit, and the right of a lessor to accelerate payments upon default.
Other factors include whether the lessor has acquired the equipment
especially for the specific lessee customer, whether it is intended that
the equipment will be permanently affixed to the lessee's premises, and
whether there are reasons other than retention of security, such as those
96. The definition is based upon the Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 1 and the
case law developed thereunder. The definition under that act included inter alia "any
contract for the bailment or leasing of goods by which the bailee or lessee contracts to
pay as compensation a sum substantially equivalent to the value of'the goods, and by
which it is agreed that the bailee- or lessee is bound to become, or has the option of
becoming the owner of such goods upon full conpliance with the terms of the con-
tract."
97. E.g., In re Atlanta Times Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820 (ND. Ga. 1966), aff'd per curirm
sub nom. Sanders v. National Acceptance Co. of America, 383 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1967).
The lease contained this provision: "[It is and is intended to be a lease, and Lessee does
not hereby acquire any right, title or interest in and to the chattels, except the right to
use the same under the terms hereof."
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discussed at the beginning of this article, which stand up under analysis
as legitimate justifications for casting the transaction in the form of a lease
rather than as a conditional sale or chattel mortgage.
Some of these factors will be analyzed in discussing the case law, but
several initial points are obvious. The form of, and factual background
and circumstances pertaining to, lease transactions vary greatly from
case to case. Few of the effects and consequences of a lease agreement
can be predicted accurately when the agreement is made. This raises
the question whether a court with the benefit of hindsight is entitled to
judge the parties' intentions by the actual consequences of their agree-
ment, rather than by the consequences which could have been foreseen
at the time their bargain was made.
Where it is not unforseen developments but the parties' own actions
which have resulted in alterations in the normal effect of the lease agree-
ment, the parties' actions, rather than their declared intentions, should
be regarded as dispositive in determining the nature of the lease. An
example is where a lessee under a written lease bearing all the indicia of
a true lease subsequently purchases the equipment for a nominal con-
sideration although the lease contained no option.
A further problem may arise if a lease of the type in the last example
is challenged before the alleged unwritten option is exercised. In such
a case, if the lease contains an entire agreement clause, its effect, when
coupled with the application of the parol evidence rule, could enable
the lessor to refute allegations of an option which conceivably might
be made by a lien creditor or trustee in bankruptcy of the lessee.
The parol evidence rule alone will not necessarily preclude the ad-
mission of evidence of an option, since an option itself is not inconsistent
with a lease. However, where the court concludes that the written lease
is intended as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the
agreement,98 extrinsic evidence of further terms is not admissible. One
means which has been used to exclude evidence of a verbal option is
an entire agreement clause. In-the Atlanta Times case 9 the result of
such a clause was a holding that the written -lease was conclusively pre-
sumed to contain the entire agreement.
The merit of the conclusive exclusion of other evidence in this type
of case is open to some question, and one wonders whether the court
would have taken the same approach if there had been stronger factual
98. This common law principle is made statutory, so far as sales are concerned, by
U.C.C. § 2-202. See In re Atlanta Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820, 825 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
99. 259 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
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evidence of a collateral option agreement. 00 At no point did the court
refer to the line of authority holding that the parol evidence rule does
not apply to persons other than parties to the document. Admittedly,
"the precedents are often arbitrary and confused," 101 but they do con-
tain many clear statements epitomized by the following:
The Parol Evidence rule does not apply in litigation between one
or more parties to the written instrument and a stranger to the
written instrument, but only applies to litigation between the
parties and their privies.102
The significance of the issue becomes apparent from a review of the
cases. To date, only one lease, which did not include an option to pur-
chase, has been held to create a security interest.0 3 In fact, the absence
of an option has been regarded as strong evidence that the lease is not
intended as security.1 4 This suggests the obvious possibility that parties
desirous of evading Article 9 will adopt an entire agreement clause in
the lease but reach an extrinsic verbal gentlemen's agreement embodying
the option to purchase. Admittedly, as the court pointed out in Atlanta
Times, the parties, especially the lessee, will not often be willing to
rely on a verbal understanding in transactions of substantial proportions.
The strongest argument for upholding the parol evidence rule in
cases such as Atlanta Times is that the primary test for determining
100. 'Even if admissible, the testimony regarding the existence of an option to acquire
the leased property fails of its mark. Taken in the light most favorable to the trustee, it
would show no more than an expectancy, not legally enforceable." Id. at 825. This
evidence was disputed by other unequivocal testimony to the effect that there was no
agreement to give an option. See also Burton v. Tatelbaum, 240 Md. 280, 213 A.2d 875
(1965), in which testimony of an option agreement was also excluded, but again the
court considered that even if admitted, the evidence would not have altered the result.
101. J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2446 & n.5 (1940).
102. Swift v. Beaty, 39 Tenn. App. 292, 282 S.W.2d 655, 658 (1955); accord, Bowman
v. Tax Comm., 135 Ohio St. 295, 20 N.E.2d 916, 919 (1939). "While parol evidence may
not be received to contradict or vary the terms of a written instrument as between the
parties thereto and their privies, such evidence is admissible when otherwise competent
in controversies between strangers to the instrument, or between a stranger and a party
th'ereto."
103. In re Transcontinental Industries, Inc., 3 UCC REP. Smv. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
This was a special case in which a number of other factors outweighed the absence of
a purchase option. Cf. In re Atlanta Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ga. 1966);
In re Overbrook & Barson's, Inc., E.D. Pa., Bankruptcy No. 29210, 5 UCC REP. Stov.
546 (1968). Likewise under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § 1, the courts refused
to find a conditional sale unless the lease contained an option to purchase. E.g., Western
Machinery Co. v. Graetz, 42 Cal. App. 2d 296, 108 P.2d 711 (App. Div. 1940).
104. In re Wheatland Electric Products Co., 237 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
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whether a lease creates a security interest is the parties' intention. If an
entire agreement clause would be binding upon the parties so that a
lessee could not enforce an oral option agreement against a recalcitrant
lessor, it would follow that in law no option existed. Nonetheless, if
the parties' orally expressed intention at the time the lease was made
was that the lessee should have an option, this would be an objective fact
which the court should be entitled to take into account in determining
whether the lease created a security interest.
The test prescribed under section 1-201 (37) contemplates that the
parties' intention shall be judged objectively by reference to their total
conduct, and not merely by overt expressions of their intention. The
purpose of Article 9 would be frustrated if evidentiary rules could be
used to shield sham transactions. If evidence of an oral option is ad-
mitted and is convincing, the very fact that it was not embodied in the
written agreement is a factor tending to prove an intention to create a
secret security interest under the guise of a true lease. The policy
reasons for the parol evidence rule, designed to govern the rights of
parties to the contract inter se, are not persuasive in the context of con-
flicting claims by third party creditors. If accepted, these criticisms
would not preclude the lessor from denying the verbal option agree-
ment, but such denial would be weighed with other evidence relating to
the existence of such an option. 10 5
Economic Analysis Tests for Purchase Option
There is considerable scope for using economic and mathematical
models to evolve subsidiary tests under the final part of the section
1-201 (37) definition, which is based upon a finding that the lessee shall
become or has an option to become the owner "for no additional or for
a nominal consideration." This test is both the most positive and specific,
and the only conclusive part of the whole definition. Accordingly, it
has received most attention from the courts.
It has been suggested that this test requires a determination whether
the lease enables the lessee to acquire an equity in the chattels prior to
actually exercising the option to acquire title.106 In this context, the
term equity is used in the business or commercial sense of a financial in-
terest which really amounts to a credit against the payment which the
105. Comment, Leases as Security: Some Problems of Identification, 8 B.C. IND. &
Comm. L. REv. 764 (1967).
106. Welsh, judicial Interpretations of the Filing Requirements Under Article 9 of
the Code, 37 Ttw. L. REv. 273, 282 (1970).
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lessee must ultimately make in order to acquire tide. This formulation
has been criticized on the grounds that the fact that the lessee might
acquire some equity is no guarantee that he will do so. 07 The answer to
this criticism is twofold.
(a) The section 1-201 (37) test is one of intent, although the circum-
stances and terms of the lease must be viewed objectively to determine
that intent. These factors must be considered as of the date of com-
mencement of the lease agreement. The court is placed in a position at
least as advantageous as that of the parties for determining the outcome
of the financial aspects of the lease as they would have appeared to them
when the bargain was made.
(b) Once the lessee has acquired a substantial equity in the equipment
which enables it to acquire tide at less than current market value,
common sense indicates that the option will be exercised. 08 This fact
of business life overcomes any continued reliance upon the distinction
between a buyer under a conditional sale who is "obliged to purchase"
and a lessee who merely has an "option to purchase." 109
The "equity" formulation is a reasonable one, provided it is regarded
functionally in an economic or business sense, and is not confused with
legal concepts such as equitable interest or the passing of title. As
an economic formulation it naturally presupposes further subrules for
its implementation in actual cases. The courts have now embarked upon
economic analysis which has made possible the articulation of certain
tentative subrules.
1. Ratio of Option Price to Original List Price
If no consideration or a nominal consideration (in the sense in which
courts "frequently use it interchangeably with the sum of $1.00 or
some other small amount") is required, the definition per se requires
a findi of a security interest.
107. Comment, Equipment Leasing Under the UCC, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 125, 135 &
n.62 (1965).
108. Comment, supra note 66, at 695.
109. This distinction first received judicial approval in England in the landmark case
of Helby v. Matthews [1895] A.C. 471, where the House of Lords upheld the ingenuity
of the draftsman in devising the hire-purchase agreement. The importance of the
distinction in English and Australian law is that a hirer under a hire-purchase agree-
ment, who has an option, but not an obligation, to purchase cannot pass title to a bona
'fide purchaser, as can a conditional purchaser under the Factors Act 1899, § 9. Similarly,
the goods are not available to the hirer's other creditors or trustee in bankruptcy, nor
need the hire-purchase agreement be filed or registered. The distinction is entirely
legalistic and serves no legitimate function or social purpose.
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In other cases, a comparison of the option price with the original list
price may be meaningful. In a number of cases, comparisons of option
prices yielding percentages of 25 percent,"' 32 percent,"' and 58 per-
cent" 2 of list price were persuasive in a finding of a true lease."5
However, this direct comparison is usually inadequate, since a lessee
may still be obtaining title for less than full consideration if the option
price is substantially less than actual market value at the time of its
exercise. If this is so, it follows that unless the lessor has made a very
bad bargain, it will already have received the difference between market
value and the option price by way of rentals which represented more
than payment for mere use. Hence, the analysis should also take into
account rentals already paid and the market value of the equipment at
the date of exercise of the option.
2. Ratio of Option Price to Market Value
The relationship which the option price bears to the actual market
value of the equipment when the option to purchase may be exercised
comes much closer to reflecting the terms of the definition. How-
ever, it is important not to regard any discrepancy between the two
figures as conclusive. The lessor and lessee at the time of entering the
lease do not know the precise effect which obsolescence and market
fluctuations will have upon the value of the equipment. The test should
require the court to disregard the benefit of hindsight, and to determine
whether the option price provided in the agreement bore a reasonable
relationship to what the parties might reasonably have anticipated the
market value to be at the time contemplated for exercise of the option.
In every case, the courts have made this comparison, although re-
gard is often paid to the actual market value at the time for exercise of
the option, rather than a hypothetical estimate of that value made as at
the commencement of the lease." 4 Admittedly, the distance between
the option price and actual market value was so great in some of these
110. In re Wheatland Electric Products Co., 237 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
111. In re Alpha Creamery Co., 4 UCC REP. SERV. 794 (W. D. Mich. 1967).
112. Crest Investment Trust, Inc. v. Atlantic Mobile Corp., 252 Md. 286, 250 A.2d
246 (1969).
113. On the other hand, a ratio of less than 25 percent is to be considered as showing
an intent to make a lease a security. In re Alpha Creamery Co., 4 UCC REP. SERv.
794, 797-98 (W.D. Mich. 1967).
114. "[Tlhe determining factor to be considered is the intention of the parties at the
time the contract was entered into as construed in the light of facts and circumstances




cases that no reasonable estimate could possibly have been anywhere
near as low as the option price." 5 However, it is important that the
principle of law should be clearly stated so that a correct result will be
obtained in cases closer to the borderline.
In determining the anticipated market value at the option exercise
date, evidence of the depreciation methods adopted by the lessor for
accounting purposes, and especially those allowed by the Internal Reve-
nue Service for taxation purposes, will be relevant.
3. Meaning of Nominal Consideration
Once the margin between the anticipated market value and a lower
option price is calculated, a determination must be made whether this
discount margin is so substantial as to render the option price nominal
consideration within the meaning of the definition. This raises a major
unresolved issue as to whether nominal is intended to cover any con-
sideration which is not fair, adequate, and related to actual value al-
though it may be substantial, or whether the term is confined to a non-
substantial amount.
Louis Del Duca has suggested that the "Code test would appear to
weight the scales in favor of a ruling that a transaction qualifies as a
bona fide lease where a substantial consideration not clearly consti-
tuting a 'fair' or 'adequate' consideration is paid." 116 However, he
qualifies this prima facie view by stating that "[i] t would appear, how-
ever, that to find the 'lease' to be qualified as a bona fide lease, a term
in the lease requiring payment of some amount approaching a 'fair' or
'adequate' consideration for the chattel at the time the option to pur-
chase is exercised would be necessary."
Although he offers no authority for this interpretation, and there
appears to be none in point,"z7 this view finds support in the general
115. For example, equipment whose current market value had depreciated to be-
tween $7,500 and $10,000 could be acquired for an option price of $1,350. In re
Washington Processing Co., 3 UCC REPs. SERV. 475 (S.D. Cal. 1966). In another
case, the lessee could have exercised its option for about 40 percent of the depreciated
value. In re Transcontinental Industries, Inc., 3 UCC REP. SERV. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
In neither case did the referee consider specifically the appropriate rate of depreciation.
116. Del Duca, Evolving Standards for Distinguishing a "Bona Fide Lease" from a
"Lease Intended as Security"-Impact on Priorities, 75 CoM. L.J. 218, 219 (1970).
117. Judge Miller has pointed out that the courts have used the term "nominal" inter-
changeably with the sum of $1.00 or some other small amount. In re Wheatland Electric
Products Co., 237 F. Supp. 820, 822 (W.D. Pa. 1964). However, although each of the
cases he cites as examples involved bailment leases with option prices of $1.00, no issue
turned upon the quantum or the characterization of this sum as nominal, nor was there
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purpose of Article 9. While the core meanings of the terms certainly
indicate that substantial is more nearly the contrary of nominal than
are any of the terms fair, adequate, or sufficient, it seems obvious that
an option price which is substantial in absolute amount, such as $1 mil-
lion, will be inadequate, and therefore an indication of a security in-
terest, if it is only 50 percent of the anticipated market value of the
equipment at the contemplated option exercise date." 8
It is submitted that substantial or nominal should not be considered
as criteria for measuring dollar amounts of option prices in absolute
terms. Rather, these option prices should be measured as percentages
of anticipated market value. If this percentage is substantial, for ex-
ample, above 80 percent, there is a good case for treating the agreement
as a bona fide lease. Such a benchmark allows some leeway for dif-
ferences of opinion as to depreciation rates and the charging of higher
rentals in early years to offset the lessor's risk of early obsolescence.
However, any percentage falling below some such benchmark should
be regarded as nominal within the meaning of the definition.
The author acknowledges a natural inclination to recoil from the
proposition that anything below 80 percent is a nominal figure. On
closer examination, this may be seen as merely succumbing to the temp-
tation to apply the well established contract law principle that adequacy
of consideration is immaterial. In the contract field, the distinction is
truly between:
(a) a purely nominal consideration of one dollar, which may be in-
sufficient to support a contract because it is wholly illusory; and
(b) a substantial, though totally inadequate and unfair, considera-
tion which will support a contract because the courts will not inquire
into the fairness of the bargain, except where, for example, fraud is
alleged or specific performance sought.
The purposes of required filing under Article 9, the protection of
other creditors and bona fide purchasers and prevention of secret liens,
suggest a very different interpretation of nominal. The author submits
that for these purposes any payment which fails to bear a reasonable
relation, for example 80 percent, to anticipated market value should be
regarded as nominal. If the above reasoning is a correct analysis of the
any indication that the court would confine the term "nominal consideration" to an
amount of this order.
118. Conversely, an option price of $1.00 could be adequate and fair (although not
substantial in absolute terms) if this genuinely was the anticipated market value.
[Vol. 13:110
EQUIPMENT LEASES
legislative purpose in Article 9, consideration might be given to the
desirability of amending the final part of the definition of security in-
terest to read "for no consideration or for a substantially smaller con-
sideration than the actual market value of the property." This would
avoid any unnecessary confusion arising from use of the term nominal.
The device used in many leases of allowing the lessee to credit all
or a percentage of rentals paid against the option price is only a method
of calculation or bookkeeping. The quantum of the option price is
clearly the amount of fresh consideration which must be furnished in
order to acquire title. The credit for rentals paid may be achieved
in several different ways.
(a) An option may be granted which is exercisable at any time dur-
ing the currency of the lease. The option price is stated as list price,
but credit is allowed for a certain percent of rentals already paid. Sev-
eral cases using this method have come before the courts, and leases
providing for a credit of 100 percent, 119 85 percent, 120 80 percent, 1
and 75 percent 22 have all been held to create security interests.
However, another case, in which a lease providing for a credit of up
to 75 percent of rentals paid was held to be a true lease, illustrates that
the crucial figure is not the percentage of rentals credited, but rather the
relationship of the new consideration furnished to the anticipated market
value at the date the option is exercised. The case, Iz re Alpha Cream-
ery Co., Ino., 23 involved a three year lease of a typewriter accounting
machine at a monthly rental of $118. The lease contained a purchase
option rider under which the lessee could purchase the equipment at any
time during the lease at the list price of $4,690. Credit would be allowed
for a deposit of $234 plus 75 percent of rentals paid in if the option were
exercised during the first year, or 70 percent if exercised thereafter.
However, since the anticipated depreciation of the equipment in the
first two years of the lease was nearly equal to the rentals, the allow-
ance of credit for 75 percent of the rentals resulted in a faster rate of
depreciation than the accrual of credit. The result was that until very
near the end of the term the option price exceeded slightly the antici-
119. General Electric Credit Corp. v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 244 Ark. 984, 429
S.W.2d 60 (1968).
120. United Rental Equipment Co. v. Potts and Callahan Contracting Co., 231 Md.
552, 191 A.2d 570 (1963). The report does not state explicitly that the option could be
exercised at any time during the lease, but the absence of any stated restriction appears
to imply that this was the case.
121. In re Royer's Bakery, Inc., 1 UCC REP. SERV. 342 (ED. Pa. 1963).
122. Stanley v. Fabricators, Inc., 459 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1969).
123. 4 UCC Rn,. SmV. 794 (W.D. Mich. 1967).
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pated market value of the equipment. Influenced to some extent by
this factor,124 the court held that the consideration was not nominal and
that the lease was a true lease.
Crest Investment Trust, Inc. v. Atlantic Mobile Corp.25 is a similar
case where 75 percent of the rental payments could be deducted from
an option price of $3,400 for an office trailer. Since the option was only
exercisable within one year of commencement of the lease, 126 the maxi-
mum possible credit was 75 percent of the annual rent of $1,920 (equal-
ling $1,440), leaving a minimum option price of $1,960, which was con-
sidered not to be nominal when compared with the total price of
$3,400. The categorization of this relationship, expressed as a percent-
age at 58 percent, can not be criticized. However, the court apparently
assumed that the figure of $3,400 represented the actual value of the
trailer at the end of one year, although nowhere in the opinion is there
any reference to evidence having been given on this point.
A case with somewhat similar initial facts is In re Wheatland Elec-
tric Products Co., 27 but the finding of a true lease was based upon the
fact that the original lease had been superseded and the option had been
allowed to expire at the relevant time.
(b) A similar result may be obtained where the lease stipulates a
fixed option price and precludes the allowance of any credit for rentals
paid, but requires that the purchase option can only be exercised after
all or a stated number of the rental installments have been paid on
their due dates. It is more difficult to compare the cases within this
category in terms of percentages because of the differing formulas pre-
scribed in the lease agreements and the absence of full valuation figures
in the reports.
For example, in Washington Processing Co.,12 the three year lease
provided for total rental payments of nearly $14,000 and an option to
purchase, exercisable only at the end of the lease, for $1,350. The
court's decision that this option price was nominal in relation to the
current value of the equipment estimated at between $7,500 and $10,500
124. In fact Referee Bension appeared to attach greater weight to the ratio of option
price to list price, and held that 32 percent represented an amount that was not nominal.
The author has explained above his objections to this approach.
125. 252 Md. 286, 250 A.2d 246 (1969).
126. The written lease appeared to confine precisely the exercise of purchase option
to the first anniversary of the lease. However, the lessor's practice was to allow the
option to be exercised at any time after delivery, and the court's opinion is based upon
this practice, rather than the strict terms of the purchase option.
127. 237 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
128. 3 UCC REP. Ss.Rv. 475 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
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is clearly correct. The decision also supports the previous comment
that consideration by no means equivalent to one dollar or nominal in
absolute terms may still be nominal in relation to actual value for the
purposes of the section 1-201 (37) definition. The only criticism of the
decision is the referee's failure to inquire as to the estimated value which
the parties at the commencement of the lease129 would have anticipated
the equipment would have had at the time contemplated for exercise
of the purchase option, three years later. Theoretically, this might well
have approximated $1,350, although the court's oversight is probably
excused by the common assumption, in the absence of specific contrary
evidence, that the actual value of $7,500 to $10,500 was indeed the
anticipated value.
However, In re Merkel Inc.1 0 is not explained or justified so easily.
A five year lease stipulated gross rentals of $9,120 and an option exer-
cisable at the end of the lease for $800. The court measured the $800,
which was less than nine percent, against the total rentals, and held
the consideration to be nominal. No attempt was made to relate the
option price to the anticipated or actual value of the machinery at the
end of the lease.
Other Indicia of Intention
While the ratio of option price to anticipated market value, and often,
though less correcdy, the ratio of option price to total rentals, per se
can lead to a finding of a security interest, a finding of an adequate
option price does not conclude the issue in the opposite direction. Mov-
ing one step further, the absence of an option, although a very important
factor, does not preclude a finding of a security agreement. A brief
examination will therefore be made of other indicia, which, taken alone
or cumulatively and with or without a purchase option, may demonstrate
an intention to create a security interest.
t. Relationship of Total Rentals to Market Purchase Price
If the structure of the lease, comprising its minimum term multiplied
by the periodic rental for that term, will enable the lessor to recover
the present cash market value in full plus interest at an appropriate
rate, the lessor may not need or intend ever to recover possession of the
129. See note 114 supra.
130. 45 Misc. 2d 753, 258 N.Y.S.2d 118 (Sup. Ct. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 25
App. Div. 764, 269 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1966). On the appeal, two judges found the lease to
be a true lease, although their reasoning is not reported in the opinions.
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leased equipment once all rentals have been paid in full.'31 However,
absent a purchase option at a nominal figure, an intention to abandon
its proprietary interest in leased equipment can not easily be imputed
to the lessor. On the other hand, if there is added to the above facts
a finding that the minimum term closely approximates the anticipated
economic life of the equipment, the intention becomes fairly obvious.
2. Relationship of Periodic Rental to Market Rental
A similar intention of security may be indicated where the periodic
rental is substantially higher than prevailing market rentals for similar
equipment. Since the lessor will obtain his return more quickly, an
argument can be made that it will release the equipment to the lessee
for a nominal consideration even though there is no express option.
The argument is really only a makeweight, since most commercial
lessors will seek to obtain the highest possible return, including any
residual value in equipment at the end of a lease. The higher than
market rental may reflect the lessor's conservative judgment on the
risk of obsolescence.
3. Other Conditions of the Lease Agreement and
Surrounding Circumstances
While a number of cases have involved consideration of other fac-
tors, the most important is probably In re Transcontinental Industries, 32
since it is the only reported case of a lease without an option being held
to create a security interest. The referee did not rely on any one con-
dition in the lease, but rather upon the aggregation of the following
conditions together with other surrounding circumstances.
(a) The lessee was required to pay all taxes and insurance premiums,
and make repairs and alterations.
(b) The lessee was required to pay a stipulated loss value to the
lessor in the event of destruction of the equipment, and to indemnify
the lessor against all damages 'and claims arising out of the delivery,
use, or return of the equipment.
(c) The lessee was required to pay a substantial deposit and obtain
waivers from landlords.
131. In other words, the rentals duly discounted equal or exceed present market value.
Of course, the problem remains of determining the appropriate discount rate, and this
determination will have a substantial influence upon the apparent relationship of total
rentals to market values. Examples of these capitalization techniques are given by
Gant, supra note 8, at 139-40, exh. VI and VII.
132. 3 UCC REP. SERV. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
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(d) The lease provided for acceleration and the payment of attor-
ney's fees in the event of default.13
(e) Although there was no option to purchase, the lessee was given
a right of first refusal at the end of the lease period.
The conditions referred to in (a) and (b) taken alone appear to be
'equivocal on the issue of creation of a security interest. Clauses similar
to those in (a) have been present in other agreements held to be true
leases,'34 and clause (b) only appears to protect the lessor from the
risk of inadequate insurance coverage. The other conditions are sub-
stantial indications of a security interest, although the requirement of
-a deposit is somewhat equivocal.'-3
Other surrounding circumstances which influenced the findings of
the referee in Transcontinental included the following.
(a) The lessor never supplied equipment itself, but purchased equip-
ment specifically for the purpose of leasing to the individual lessee re-
questing it.186 The lessor's staff was not capable of physically handling
the volume of equipment leased by it, nor was there any evidence of
storage facilities or handling procedures for such equipment. From these
circumstances, the referee concluded that "at the termination of the
leases the property for the most part was retained by the lessees either
through purchase or exercise of rent renewal option." '3 7
There are other circumstances which imply an intention to grant a
"9one-time lease" of equipment which the lessor does not anticipate
reclaiming. The most striking example is where the utilization of the
equipment approved by the lessor involves its attachment to realty or
other chattels by means which render its removal impossible without
substantial impairment. 3  A less usual illustration is where the lease
period exceeds the expected life of the equipment.'39
133. Accord, In re Pomona Valley Inn, 4 UCC REP. SERv. 893 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
134. E.g., Burton v. Tatelbaum, 240 Md. 280, 213 A.2d 875 (1965); In re Atlanta
Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820 (ND. Ga. 1966).
135. "The absence of a security deposit tends to indicate that a true lease was in-
tended, although its presence may be shown to serve a legitimate purpose rather than
to serve as a disguised down payment." Welsh, supra note 106, at 283, citing Sanders
v. National Acceptance Corp. of America, 383 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1967) and Sanders
v. Commercial Credit Corp., 398 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1968).
136. Accord, In re Pomona Valley Inn, 4 UCC REP. SERv. 893 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
137. 3 UCC RE'. SFav. 235, 244 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
138. If the equipment becomes a fixture and the lease is held to create a security in-
terest therein, priorities will be regulated by section 9-313. See Leary, supra note 59, at
232-35. For an illustration of a holding that equipment attached to realty was the sub-
ject of a true lease, see Burton v. Tatelbaum, 240 Md. 280, 213 A.2d 875 (1965).
139. In re Pomona Valley Inn, 4 UCC REP. SERV. 893 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
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(b) Although the lessor had purchased the equipment direct from
the supplier, a bill of sale was required from the lessee as an additional
precaution to ensure that the lessor obtained title without reservation.
Since the lessee never had tide to pass to the lessor, this was really a
paper device for further assurance, and not in fact a sale and lease
back. In itself, it would not have supported a finding of a security
interest.
Where the lease does arise out of a sale from lessee to lessor, "the
facts seem to point clearly to the conclusions (a) that the sale and
lease are not independent transactions, (b) that the price of the one
is integrally related to the price of the other, and (c) that the trans-
action is a secured borrowing." 140 The author adopts these conclu-
sions reached by Professor Myers after a comprehensive empirical
study. It should be pointed out that while conclusions (a) and (b)
are inferences of fact, conclusion (c) is equivalent to a statement of a
legal result that Article 9 is applicable.
Identical conclusions have been reached by English' 4' and Austral-
ian' - courts where interdependence of the sale and hire-purchase agree-
ment or lease-back to the seller could be shown. Earlier American de-
cisions in lease-back situations were based upon an estoppel arising
from the lack of change of possession,143 and such an estoppel could be
avoided, in theory at least, by providing for a notorious change of pos-
session or by clear labelling to indicate the change of ownership. How-
ever, the test in section 1-201 (37) makes no specific reference to out-
ward appearances, but calls for an examination of the parties' actual
intentions.
While the initial discussion of the reasons for leasing showed that
accounting, and to a lesser extent tax, reasons may justify a sale and
lease-back, the intention that the lessor shall retain a security in the
equipment can not be ignored.
(c) The agreement required the lessee to sign such financing state-
140. See Myers, supra note 18, at 6. These conclusions were adopted by the Ac-
counting Principles Board, supra note 21, % 19-22.
141. In re Watson, [1890] 25 Q.B.D. 27; Soneleigh Finance Ltd. v. Phillips, [1965] 2
Q.B. 537.
142. Price v. Parsons, 54 C.L.R. 332 (1936); Boydell v. James, 36 S.R. (N.S.W.) 620
(1936).
143. Davis v. Bigler, 62 Pa. 242, 1 Am. Rep. 393 (1869). Another problem arises
where there has been no change of possession because of the rule in many states that
retention of possession of personal property by a seller is fraudulent. See, e.g., 1 G.
GLEN, FRAuDuLENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 346-63 (1940) and cases cited
therein; Leary, supra note 59, at 231.
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ments as were required to perfect the lessor's interest under the Code.
The lessor did prepare and file, although apparently deficiently, such a
statement. As pointed out earlier, such a requirement and the actual
filing may be only precautionary and do not necessarily indicate an
intention that the lease should operate as a security. An express denial
of any such intention should be sufficient to negate any such implication.
4. Treatment for Tax and Accounting Purposes
If the parties prepare their tax returns or financial statements on the
basis that the lessee has purchased the equipment, this is a clear indica-
tion of their intentions. However, for taxation and accounting reasons
explained earlier, the lessee is unlikely to capitalize lease transactions
except where they are clearly conditional sales under Article 9. The
lessor's balance sheet treatment of equipment leases has caused far less
difficulty than the lessee's, but the inclusion of equipment leases in the
lessor's balance sheet as either "receivables under contracts for equip-
ment rentals" or "equipment held for lease" respectively is also relevant
to the determination of the parties' intentions. 144
Apart from the way in which the parties' own treatment of their
transactions may reflect upon their intentions, the ruling principles laid
down by taxation and accounting authorities are not particularly
helpful to the resolution of the lease question under Article 9.145 The
Guide for Tax Treatment of Leases of Equipment40 issued by the In-
ternal Revenue Service under section 162(a) (3) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954 has been referred to by the courts in Article 9 cases. 47
However, it offers no further analysis than that outlined in this article
on such questions as when the lessee has acquired an equity or the
meaning of nominal consideration for a purchase option.
Accounting authorities have suggested that the test for determining
whether the leased equipment should be capitalized on the lessee's
balance sheet is whether "the terms of the lease result in the creation
of a material equity in the property." 148 The following quotation from
144. Burton v. Tatelbaum, 240 Md. 280, 312 A.2d 875 (1965).
145. For a general discussion of the taxation guidelines see Leary, supra note 59, at
238-40.
146. Rev. Rul. 540, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 39.
147. E.g., In re Royer's Bakery, Inc., 1 UCC REP. Smav. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
148. Note 22 supra, at 10. The criterion previously recommended was whether
"the transaction involved in substance a purchase." APB ACcoUNTING PmNCIPLES, Ac-
coUNTING REsEARCH BULL. No. 43, ch. 14, 7 (1953). The Board rejected the criteria
suggested by Professor Myers of "the extent ... that leases give rise to property
rights." Myers, supra note 18, at 4.
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the latest opinion of the Accounting Principles Board shows how closely
its recommended principles approximate the tests suggested above for
implementing the definition of security interest in section 9-201 (37):
The presence, in a noncancelable lease or in a lease cancelable
only upon the occurrence of some remote contingency, of either
of the two following conditions will usually establish that a lease
should be considered to be in substance a purchase:
a. The initial term is materially less than the useful life of the
property, and the lessee has the option to renew the lease for
the remaining useful life of the property at substantially
less than the fair rental value; or
b. The lessee has the right, during or at the expiration of the
lease, to acquire the property at a price which at the incep-
tion of the lease appears to be substantially less than the
probable fair value of the property at the time or times of
permitted acquisition by the lessee.
The determination that lease payments result in the creation of
an equity in the property obviously requires a careful evaluation of
the facts and probabilities surrounding a given case. Unless it is
clear that no material equity in the property will result from the
lease, the existence, in connection with a noncancelable lease or a
lease cancelable only upon the occurrence of some remote con-
tingency, of one or more circumstances such as those shown below
tend to indicate that the lease arrangement is in substance a pur-
chase and should be accounted for as such.
a. The property was acquired by the lessor to meet the special
needs of the lessee and will probably be usable only for that
purpose and only by the lessee.
b. The term of the lease corresponds substantially to the esti-
mated useful life of the property, and the lessee is obligated
to pay costs such as taxes, insurance, and maintenance, which
are usually considered incidental to ownership.
c. The lessee has guaranteed the obligations of the lessor with
respect to the property leased.
d. The lessee has treated the lease as a purchase for tax pur-
poses.14 9
However, in a subsequent opinion on Accounting for Leases in




Financial Statements of Lessors,150 the Board did not adopt specific cri-
teria, but listed a number of pertinent factors including but not limited
to those adopted in Opinion No. 5 for lessee's financial statements.
Thus, the Board recognized the possibility that leases would continue
to be treated as receivables in the balance sheets of lessors while being
excluded as assets or obligations in the balance sheets of lessees-that is,
neither party would disclose the ownership of the equipment as an
asset. The Board justified this apparent inconsistency by emphasizing
"the principal accounting problem of lessors to be the allocation of
revenue and expense to accounting periods covered by the lease in a
manner that meets the objective of fairly stating the lessor's net in-
come." I"' The Board acknowledged that there "continues to be a
question as to whether assets and the related obligations should be re-.
flected in the balance sheet for lessees other than those that are in sub-
stance installment purchases. The Board will continue to give consid-
eration to this question." 152
It would appear that the tests adopted by the taxation and account-
ing authorities, though basically consistent with the policy of the Code
definition of security interest, shed no further light on the analysis
suggested in this article. However, the parties' own treatment of their
transactions as sales or purchases in tax returns and financial statements
could be weighty evidence of their intention to create Article 9 secur-
ity interests. Conversely, treatment as true leases is only self-serving'
testimony, and would not of itself rebut an intention to create a secur-
ity interest inferred by virtue of the other criteria discussed above.
The above analysis suggests the following conclusions regarding the
Code definition of security interest.
(a) The primary test of the existence of a security interest is the
parties' intention, objectively determined.
(b) The Code positively requires a finding of such an intention only
where an option to purchase may be exercised for no consideration or
a nominal consideration.
(c) The test of nominal consideration requires a comparison of the
option price with what the parties at the commencement of the lease
might reasonably have anticipated would be the market value at the'
time for exercise of the option. By expressing this comparison as a
150. APB AccouNnNG PRINCIPLES, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BoAnD, OPINON No.7 (May,
1966).
151. Id. at 18.
152. Id.
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percentage, the term nominal should be applied as a measure of rela-
tive, rather than absolute, value.
(d) A figure of 80 percent of market value is suggested as the bench-
mark below which the option price may be considered nominal. This,
or any alternative percentage, should not be applied as an absolute rule,
however. Such a figure could be used as a presumption casting the
burden of disproving intent to create a security interest upon the lessor.
In any event, the opportunity should remain for the lessor to introduce
evidence of a contrary intention.
(e) Where there is no option to purchase or where the considera-
tion approximates actual market value, no presumption is indicated
under the Code definition, nor is any justified in either direction. The
presence of any of the factors discussed above or any other relevant
circumstances should be weighed by the court to determine objectively
the parties' intention. Too strict an application of the parol evidence
rule to a lease containing an entire agreement clause appears unjustified
and could work injustice to the lessee's other creditors.
CONCLUSION: POLICY ISSUES
Some brief concluding remarks seem necessary in relation to three
policy issues arising out of this analysis and foreshadowed at the be-
ginning of this article.
Is it sound policy for Article 9 to apply to leases
intended as security?
The stated policy of Article 9 is that "the traditional distinctions
among security devices, based largely on form are not retained ....
The scheme of the Article is to make distinctions, where distinctions
are necessary, along functional rather than formal lines." 153
One important expression of this policy is the rejection of any reli-
ance upon written instruments or the concept of title as criteria for the
existence of a security interest.154 This position is in marked contrast
to Commonwealth Bills of Sale legislation, which only strikes at trans-
fers or assurances of proprietary interests in goods created by docu-
ments.155
153. U.C.C. § 9-101, Comment.
154. Id. and U.C.C. § 9-202.
155. For similar reasons the Accounting Principles Board rejected Professor Myer's
criterion of the creation of property rights. OPINION No.5, supra note 149, at 5, 9
where the following statement appears: "[Some lease agreements are essentially
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The Code's policy is justified because it is functional and attempts
to reflect the realities of the transactions it regulates. The inclusion of
"leases intended as security" within the ambit of Article 9 is entirely
justified because this type of lease achieves the same functional result
as other forms of chattel security. Some inconsistencies as to the lessor's
remedies arise from the application of Part V of Article 9 to leases
intended as security but not to true leases.156 Consideration could be
given to extending similar provisions to true leases. Such action may
be justified and achieved without raising the further question of
whether the perfection and priority provisions of Article 9 should be
extended to true leases. That question is discussed below.
Are the existing Code definition and the author's
suggestions for implementation consistent vith the general
policy of Article 9?
The functional policy of Article 9 dictates that all transactions in
tended to create security interests in personal property should be regu-
lated by the perfection and priority provisions. Although these provi-
sions contain many variations and exceptions, they are based upon the
function of the transaction or the type of collateral involved. It is
submitted that, subject to one possible qualification raised below, the
method of implementing the definition of "leases intended as security"
outlined in this article only equates with other security interests those
leases which are intended to achieve essentially similar results, and is
therefore consistent with the policy of Article 9.
Should the ambit of the definition be expanded so that
Article 9 applies to true leases?
This is a broader issue, and requires some analysis of the ultimate
purpose of Article 9 and what classes of persons the perfection and
priority provisions are intended to protect. The qualification fore-
shadowed in the previous paragraph relates not to the adequacy of the
means suggested for implementing the present definition, but rather to
the question of whether the definition itself should be broadened to
cover leases other than those intended as security.
The perfection and priority provisions of Article 9 are designed to
equivalent to installment purchases of property. In such cases, the substance of the
arrangement, rather than its legal form, should determine the accounting treatment."
156. See text accompanying notes 64-91 supra.
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protect unsecured creditors of the lessee,' transferees in bulk from the
lessee, 58 creditors of the lessee who perfect a security interest in leased
equipment prior to perfection by the lessor,'59 and lienors who obtain
liens upon the leased equipment for services or materials furnished with
respect thereto.' 0 The question then becomes whether these parties
are entitled to similar protection when the equipment is held by the
lessee under a true lease.
As demonstrated earlier,'"' a bona fide purchaser of leased equipment
is unlikely to obtain protection except where the lessee is a merchant,
and the situation is similar whether or not the Code applies. However,
where the goods are farm equipment having an original purchase price
not exceeding $2,500 or consumer goods, filing under Article 9 becomes
material.
The protection offered to these parties by the Code is twofold:
(a) if the lease creates a security interest which has not been per-
fected, it is subordinated to these parties' claims; and
(b) if the security interest created by the lease is perfected, these
parties will have the means of ascertaining the lessee's true position be-
cause the lessor has either repossessed the equipment or filed a financing
statement. <
Since most lessors who have legal advice already file for any lease
likely to fall within the scope of Article 9, the protection of these third
parties will normally be that described in (b). This is the only way
to evaluate the purpose of Article 9, since it encourages filing by im-
posing the abovementioned sanctions for failure to file.
The primary policy of Article 9 then appears as the requirement of
notice filing for the j'rotection of the abovementioned parties. 16 The
major argument for requiring such notice in the case of a true lease
is that in its absence others may rely upon the lessee's apparent owner-
ship in extending credit or in purchasing the leased equipment from
the lessee. Support for the argument may be found in the recording
157. U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (a), (3) (lien creditors).
158. U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (b).
159. U.C.C. §§ 9-301 (1) (a), 9-312 and other priority sections referred to in section
9-312(1).
160. U.C.C. § 9-310.
161. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
162. "The prime purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code is to require that all per-
sons holding security interests in any property to publicly reveal such interest by the
filing of a short and simple, but concise statement." In re Transcontinental Industries,
Inc, 3 UCC REP. SERV. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
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statutes of a few states which require all long-term bailments'O to be
recorded.
.Another argument is that although a purchaser of equipment from a
lessee who has no power to sell can obtain no title, if the lessor has in
fact filed a financing statement to obtain protection from lien creditors,
the purchaser will be able to ascertain the true state of the title by a
search.16 However, a lessee wishing to unlawfully dispose of equipment
could use a fence or false name with the result that a search would not
reveal the financing statement.
One proponent has argued that "there should be a presumption in
favor of the application of Division Nine to most business leases," I6'
supporting his contention by the secret lien argument and the facts
that filing is simple, involving little time or cost, and that most lessors
informed by counsel file anyway. He suggests exclusion of leases for
a term of less than six months and short periodic leases. 66
Rules of thumb or statutory provisions based upon the distinction be-
tween a business lease of equipment and a consumer lease, and/or upon
the period of the lease, are sound in theory. However, the merits must
be weighed against the opposing claim that creditors extending credit to
debtors today no longer assume that goods in a debtor's possession are
the debtor's property. 67 The validity of this argument depends upon
163. Generally for terms in excess of three years. The relevant references to these
state statutes and to the recording requirements regarding security interest in aircraft,
buses, and trucks under federal statutes are collected in Comment, supra note 66, at 673
n.7 and Comment, supra note 14, at 770 n. 93.
164. This argument should not be confused with the doctrine of constructive notice.
The Code does not impose any penalty for failure to search nor is the author advocating
such a doctrine. U.C.C. § 1-201(25), (26), (27).
165. Comment, supra note 107, at 136.
166. A similar distinction requiring disclosure in accounts of long-term non-repetitive
leases but ignoring short-term or periodically renewable leases is recommended by the
AMERICA-, Accou~nNG ASSOCIATION, A STATEMENT OF BASIC AccoNTNG THEORY 32-33
(1966).
167. This assertion is made by the Bankruptcy Law Amendment Committee of The
Board of Trade in England as a ground for recommending the repeal of the Bankruptcy
Act provision that property in the possession, order, or disposition (reputed owner-
ship) of a bankrupt, though not in fact owned by him, forms part of his estate and
vests in his trustee. Cmnd. 222 10 (1957) cited by R. GOODE & J. ZiEGEL, supra note 93,
at 154. Although the provision is still in force in England, a corresponding provision was
deleted from the Australian Bankruptcy Act in 1966. A similar assumption apparently
underlies the unique category of "customary hire purchase agreements" created by
the New Zealand Chattels Transfer Act 1924, namely that purchasers or encumbrancers
ought to know that possession of goods within those classifications regarded by law as
customarily sold under hire-purchase may not be owned by the possessor. Hence, these
agreements are exempted from registration; all other hire-purchase agreements must be
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one's "judgment as to strength of the policy that a public record should
show all claims against the assets used in a business." 108
Creditors normally do not rely exclusively upon the asset value of
the equipment of the lessee as the source from which they will be paid.
If one of the lessee's reasons for choosing the lease form of financing is
to avoid recording the equipment as an asset and the corresponding
obligation as a liability on his balance sheet, creditors will have even
less cause to complain that they relied upon the equipment as an asset
of the lessee.
On balance, there would seem to be some justification for adoption
of an amendment to the definition of security interest to include all
leases, whether or not intended as security, which stipulate a non-can-
celable term in excess of a prescribed minimum, for example five years.
This addition should apply only to leases of equipment as defined in
section 9-109 (2).
Such an amendment would require filing in relation to some leases
which are not within the present scope of Article 9. However, the
burden of filing is not a heavy one, and may well be offset by the
greater certainty and consequent reduced need for legal advice which
would follow from adoption of a quantitative test such as that sug-
gested. This result is in harmony with the aim of the Code draftsmen
"to provide a simple and unified structure within which the immense
variety of present-day secured financing transactions can go forward
with less cost and with greater certainty." 169
registered to preserve the seller's tide. Chattels Transfer Act, 1924, 15 Geo. 5, No. 49,
§ 57. In the United States, "credit extension moved from apparent ownership to an
'enterprise' theory of credit" based upon submitted balance sheets, financial reports,
and credit ratings. Leary, Secured Transactions-Revolution or Evolution, 22 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 54, 59-60 (1967).
168. Leary, supra note 59, at 249.
169. U.C.C. § 9-101, Comment.
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